Porti & ambiente — le notizie raccolte

Shipping lines are adding capacity to the Asia-South America lane, as seen from assignation of the latest newbuilding deliveries. Of the six known deliveries, two ships,Maersk TokyoandCMA CGM Copper, will be deployed to Asia-South America services. Delivered from HD Hyundai Samho, the 13,136 teuCMA CGM Copperis the second last among 12 methanol-enabled sister ships that CMA CGM commissioned. CMA CGM Copperhas been sent to the Asia-West Coast South America ACSA 1 service that the French line operates jointly with Cosco and OOCL, joining a sister ship,CMA CGM Platinum. Alphaliner said the ship series was well suited to the South American trade, as they offered significant reefer capacity with their 2,100 plugs. The 8,900 teuMaersk Tokyo, ordered by Japanese tonnage provider Nissen Kaiun at Japan Marine United (now part of Imabari Shipbuilding), for long-term charter to Maersk Line, has been deployed to the Danish operator’s Asia-West Coast South America AC 3 service. MB Shipbrokers said in a report last week that South American containerised import volumes had maintained strong growth throughout 2026. From January to April 2026, total imports increased by 9.1% year on year, compared with the same period in 2025. Following an 8.6% y-o-y increase in Q1 26, imports accelerated further in April, rising 10.5% yoy, confirming a strong start to Q2 26. Import growth was primarily driven by shipments from China, which increased by nearly 20% year on year. Greater China remained South America’s largest export origin, accounting for 40% of the region’s total imports. Brazil remained the key driver of South American import demand, with imports increasing 14% year on year during the January-April period. During the first four months of 2026, Brazil accounted for 26% of the region’s total import volumes . Delivery of ultra-large ships continued to be slow, reflecting a decline in such orders in 2022 to 2023. The sole giant ship hitting the water the past week was the 24,000 teuOOCL Wisdom. Built by Nantong Cosco KHI Ship Engineering,OOCL Wisdomis the largest methanol dual-fuelled ship and will be assigned to OOCL’s Asia-North Europe service. Another ship, the 16,188 teuCMA CGM Berenice, was delivered by Jiangnan Shipyard and will be sent to CMA CGM’s Asia-Mediterranean service. One feeder, the 1,208 teuMila Green, was delivered by Jiangsu Dajin Heavy Industry and will be operated by JSV Logistics on an intra-Mediterranean service. Finally, a reefer ship,Snow Flake, will be operated by Sweden’s Cool Carriers to transport fruits worldwide. This article is © The Loadstar. Reproduction, rewriting, or derivative use requires a license. Contact[email protected]for licensing enquiries.

GD&TĐ - Nel corso dell'ultimo anno, il Giappone ha intensificato notevolmente le discussioni sull'acquisizione di sottomarini nucleari e il progetto potrebbe essere avviato a breve. Il Giapponecontinua a dibattere sulla possibilità di aggiungere sottomarini nucleari alla sua flotta e sembra stia gradualmente passando dalle discussioni teoriche a colloqui concreti su questa possibilità. Secondo Naval News, in una recente conferenza stampa, il ministro della Difesa giapponese Shinjiro Koizumi ha dichiarato che il Giappone non esclude la possibilità di acquistare sottomarini nucleari come soluzione praticabile nell'ambito di tre documenti chiave sulla difesa. Tali fondamenti sono la Strategia di Sicurezza Nazionale, la Strategia di Difesa Nazionale e il Programma di Rafforzamento delle Capacità di Difesa, che dovrebbero essere rivisti entro la fine dell'anno. La risposta del funzionario derivava dal sostegno della Marina statunitense al potenziale acquisto da parte del Giappone di sottomarini nucleari. Allo stesso tempo, Tokyo ha sottolineato che non era stata ancora presa alcuna decisione definitiva. Il capo delMinistero della Difesagiapponese ha inoltre elencato i vantaggi e gli svantaggi dei sottomarini nucleari rispetto ai sottomarini diesel-elettrici. Tra i vantaggi si annoverano una maggiore velocità e tempi di funzionamento più lunghi sia in superficie che sott'acqua, mentre tra gli svantaggi si considerano i livelli di rumore subacqueo più elevati, i costi di produzione molto alti e la necessità di conoscenze specialistiche per il funzionamento e l'utilizzo dello scafo più grande. L'intera discussione è in corso da quando, nel settembre 2025, il gruppo di esperti del Ministero della Difesa giapponese ha proposto di potenziare la flotta con sottomarini nucleari. Questa idea fu successivamente appoggiata dalla Casa Bianca e i vantaggi del suddetto veicolo da combattimento furono riconosciuti dal Comando della Forza di autodifesa marittima giapponese. Sebbene il chiaro riconoscimento delle esigenze e dei limiti della tecnologia dei sottomarini nucleari segnali un'inversione di tendenza verso discussioni serie, è ancora troppo presto per affermare che siano state prese delle decisioni. I giapponesi devono superare almeno i limiti imposti dalle proprie leggi, che consentono l'uso dell'energia nucleare solo per scopi pacifici. Alla luce di questa situazione, Defense Express sottolinea la necessità di accelerare i colloqui in corso, in considerazione del deterioramento della situazione della sicurezza regionale. Di recente, la Federazione Russa ha minacciato il Giappone con armi nucleari e ha condotto continuamente operazioni militari congiunte, mentrela Cinaha condannato attivamente la militarizzazione del Giappone e la Corea del Nord ha effettuato frequenti test missilistici nelle vicinanze. Inoltre, la Corea del Sud ha avviato la ricerca e lo sviluppo di propri sottomarini nucleari, mentre anche la Corea del Nord ne sta costruendo uno. Pertanto, intraprendere un progetto simile sembra allettante per il Giappone, ma è importante ricordare che la realizzazione di un piano del genere richiederebbe molti anni. La Forza di autodifesa marittima giapponese attualmente gestisce nove sottomarini di classe Oyashio con un dislocamento di 2.750 tonnellate, dodici sottomarini di classe Sōryū con un dislocamento di 2.900 tonnellate e cinque sottomarini di classe Taigei con un dislocamento di 3.000 tonnellate. Tutti sono dotati di sistemi di propulsione diesel-elettrica. Fonte: https://giaoducthoidai.vn/nhat-ban-som-mua-tau-ngam-hat-nhan-de-doi-pho-nga-trung-quoc-post792886.html

Dario d’Elia Il verde urbano riduce il caldo estremo nelle città, ma non è la soluzione risolutiva che talvolta si crede: secondo un nuovo studio pubblicato sulla rivista National Science Review, può anche contribuire all'inquinamento da ozono. Il gruppo di ricerca, guidato da Xin Huang dell'Università di Nanchino, ha analizzato cinque grandi agglomerati urbani dell'emisfero settentrionale per comprendere le relazioni fra verde, caldo e ozono. Di fatto ha combinato osservazioni satellitari, dati meteorologici e simulazioni numeriche per stimare gli effetti degli spazi verdi su temperature e qualità dell'aria in California, sulla costa atlantica degli Stati Uniti, nell'area di Londra e Parigi, nel delta del fiume Yangtze in Cina e lungo la costa del Pacifico giapponese vicino a Tokyo. Il decennio più caldo del secolo Il tema di fondo è che le città dell'emisfero settentrionale hanno attraversato il decennio più caldo dell'ultimo secolo. I ricercatori segnalano un aumento sia della frequenza sia dell'intensità delle ondate di calore tra il 1980 e il 2023, con una crescita di un giorno a decennio nella frequenza degli eventi estremi. Le temperature elevate favoriscono inoltre la formazione di ozono troposferico, il principale responsabile dello smog estivo, creando eventi combinati di caldo e inquinamento sempre più frequenti in aree come la pianura della Cina settentrionale, il bacino del Sichuan e il sud-ovest degli Stati Uniti. Effetti benefici e negativi Il verde urbano riduce effettivamente le temperature. Le simulazioni del modello WRF-SLUCM, che accoppia il Weather Research and Forecasting model ad uno schema di canopia urbana, cioè un modulo che rappresenta come edifici, strade e vegetazione scambiano calore e umidità con l'atmosfera, mostrano un raffreddamento medio compreso tra 0,26 e 1,08 gradi durante l'estate. L'effetto varia molto da regione a regione: la costa atlantica statunitense registra il beneficio più marcato, mentre la California, caratterizzata da un clima arido, mostra il raffreddamento più debole, perché la scarsità di umidità nel suolo limita la capacità delle piante di raffreddare l'aria tramite traspirazione. L’esempio di Tokyo Il raffreddamento indotto dal verde stabilizza lo strato limite urbano e riduce la produzione fotochimica di ozono nei centri città, dove la chimica atmosferica è tipicamente limitata dai composti organici volatili. La vegetazione stessa emette però composti organici volatili biogenici che possono alimentare la formazione di ozono. Le aree della costa atlantica mostrano l'aumento più marcato, con un incremento dell'ozono diurno fino a 7,6 microgrammi per metro cubo durante le ondate di calore. La regione di Tokyo, caratterizzata da foreste urbane dense e intense emissioni biogeniche, segue con un aumento fino a 6,2 microgrammi per metro cubo, un risultato che in questi casi supera il beneficio climatico del raffreddamento. Ripensare alle strategie di piantumazione urbana Lo studio stima comunque un beneficio complessivo per la popolazione esposta a eventi combinati di caldo e ozono, nonostante questo compromesso. Circa 7,62 milioni di persone nelle cinque aree metropolitane analizzate risulterebbero meno esposte a questi eventi grazie al verde urbano, con benefici che vanno dal 9,51% al 43,19% della popolazione locale a seconda della regione. Il rischio di un aumento dell'esposizione al solo ozono resta comunque un effetto collaterale da non sottovalutare nelle politiche di forestazione urbana. I ricercatori invitano a ripensare le strategie di piantumazione urbana tenendo conto dell'intera catena di interazioni tra vegetazione, meteorologia e chimica atmosferica, non solo dell'effetto raffreddante. Iniziative come la 3 Billion Trees Initiative dell'Unione europea o il programma cinese National Ecological Garden City puntano a espandere il verde nelle città, ma la scelta delle specie arboree, la loro densità e la loro collocazione potrebbero fare la differenza tra un beneficio netto per la salute pubblica e un aggravamento locale dell'inquinamento da ozono. Gli autori segnalano infine l'esigenza di modelli più dettagliati, capaci di rappresentare la struttura tridimensionale della vegetazione urbana e le specie arboree effettivamente piantate nelle diverse città.

(Nave a idrogeno come combustibile; foto courtesy Mitsui O.S.K. Lines -MOL) NIPPON KAIJI KYOKAI (ClassNK) ha rivisto le sue linee guida per le navi a carburante alternativo, allineando i requisiti sull’idrogeno ai nuovi standard IMO Tokyo. L’Edizione 3.1 delle Linee Guida del Registro Navale ClassNK (Nippon Kaiji Kyokai) per le Navi che Utilizzano Carburanti Alternativi aggiorna le sezioni che riguardano i combustibili idrogeno e alcol metilico/etilico. Il documento più ampio copre anche GPL e ammoniaca e vengono aggiunti requisiti strutturali per serbatoi di carburante a metanolo ed etanolo non coperti dalle attuali linee guida internazionali. Per le navi alimentate a idrogeno, ClassNK ha incorporato le nuove Linee Guida Provvisorie dell’IMO per la Sicurezza delle Navi che utilizzano idrogeno come combustibile, MSC.1/Circ.1701, approvate dal Comitato per la Sicurezza Marittima a maggio scorso. Le linee guida IMO affrontano la progettazione, l’organizzazione e i sistemi necessari per gestire i rischi specifici di incendio, esplosione e perdita dell’idrogeno. ClassNK ha fatto un passo in più aggiungendo le frequenze – stimate – di perdita di idrogeno per le apparecchiature di bordo. Le cifre, calcolate utilizzando una metodologia bayesiana, precedentemente applicata dal Registro Navale NKK ai sistemi di ammoniaca, sono pensate per fornire ai progettisti dati per le valutazioni del rischio richieste nella domanda dell’approvazione dell’Amministrazione della flag. Nel frattempo, la sezione con metanolo ed etanolo è stata ampliata con i requisiti di resistenza strutturale per i serbatoi di carburante. ClassNK ha affermato che le specifiche si basano sulla sua esperienza nella revisione dei progetti di imbarcazioni e colmano un’area non specificamente coperta dalle attuali linee guida MSC.1/Circ.1621 dell’IMO per le navi che utilizzano alcol metilico o etilico come carburante. La Società di Classificazione Navale ha introdotto per la prima volta i requisiti dedicati alle linee guida per navi alimentate a idrogeno con l’Edizione 3.0 nel 2024, prima che il quadro IMO fosse completato. Tali requisiti coprivano temi come l’accensione dell’idrogeno, la prevenzione di esplosioni e i rischi di perdite. ClassNK ha progressivamente sviluppato il documento via via che i progetti di carburanti alternativi si avvicinano alla distribuzione commerciale. L’Edizione 2.0, pubblicata nel 2022, ha aggiunto requisiti dettagliati per le navi alimentate ad ammoniaca, mentre la Società ha successivamente pubblicato le frequenze – stime – di perdita di ammoniaca per l’uso nelle valutazioni dei rischi a bordo navi. L’ultima revisione arriva mentre l’IMO continua a colmare le lacune nel quadro di sicurezza per i nuovi combustibili marini. Dopo l’approvazione delle linee guida sull’idrogeno presso la MSC 111, i lavori sono in corso sulle disposizioni obbligatorie per metanolo ed etanolo e su una regolamentazione più ampia di altri combustibili e tecnologie alternative. Abele Carruezzo

The Iran war exposed just how much the world relied on anarrow 20-mile-wide waterway. Soon after the U.S. launched strikes on Iran, the latter threatened to strike ships trying to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, the channel for much of the Middle East’s oil and gas exports.The threat of shortagespushed countries across Asia to impose export bans, cut import duties, and start rationing fuel to maintain supplies. Six months since the onset of the war,doomsday scenarios—price spikes, long lines at gas stations, power outages, and grounded flights—haven’t quite come to fruition, as increased production and hefty stockpiles blunted some of the damage. It seems that normality, in some form, could be returning to the Strait. On Wednesday, Iran announceda new revenue-sharing agreementover the waterway, though a military spokesperson blamed the U.S. for “obstructing this process.” Yet the revelation of how easy it was for Iran to block, and continue blocking, one of the world’s most important waterways is pushing governments to diversify their sources of energy. And now, with the prospect of a U.S.-Iran deal in the near-term on life support and Iranian control of Hormuznow looking securefor years to come, what previously saved the global oil market in the first half of the year might not work for a second time. “Global oil and gas supply is still a major point of geopolitical leverage,” says Saul Kavonic, head of energy research at MST Financial. “Notwithstanding the rise of alternative and green technologies over the past decade, the global economy is still very reliant on oil and gas.” “Hostile actors can threaten that for their geopolitical ends.” Before the war, roughly a fifth of the world’s oil trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz, which sits between Iran and Oman. More than 80% of that cargo was bound for Asia, primarily China, India, Japan, and South Korea. “Before this crisis many market observers would have told you it would be impossible to block or completely close the Strait of Hormuz, because a country like Iran did not have the capabilities. They tried in the 1980s, but they did not succeed,” says Carole Nakhle, CEO at Crystol Energy, an energy consultancy. Yet the conflict has shown “how easyand inexpensiveit has become to threaten very expensive energy infrastructure,” she added, with relatively cheap drones capable of putting refineries, pipelines, ports, and other multibillion-dollar facilities at risk. “This has been the big wake-up call for the entire global energy industry. It’s a fundamental paradigm shift of the last 50 years of the energy industry,” says Kavonic. “We’re moving from just-in-time supply chains to just-in-case supply chains.” Energy importers are starting to diversify. Before the war, the Middle East accounted for 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports, and roughly 11% of its liquefied natural gas. “Japan found it was morevulnerable than expected, particularly when it comes to LNG—it imports 100% of its energy,” says Kavonic. “In Japan, if the LNG doesn’t arrive, the lights go off and the country shuts down.” Now, Tokyo is investing elsewhere to shore up future supplies. Japan’s Inpex, for example, formed a joint venture to expand its LNG investment in Australia’s Northern Territory. “It’s boomtime for Woodside andChevron, two big LNG players who aren’t too concentrated in the Middle East. The oil majors are now also rapidly ramping up their investment in LNG,” Kavonic says, spotting an opportunity for buyers todiversify their sourcesof gas away from the Middle East. Exporters, too, are diversifying. For oil exporters, the major lesson has been the need to invest in alternate supply routes. That includes ploughing billions into building out ports in ports on both the western side of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Oman, effectively bypassing the strait entirely. Oil producers are alsoinvesting in pipelines, like Saudi Arabia’sEast-West pipeline.If all these additional investments pan out, only 10% of the world’s oil will need to travel through the Strait of Hormuz, down from 20% before the war. Gas, far more than oil, could become the key energy commodity hurt by a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. While crude oil can be carried via pipeline–perhaps from oil producers in the Persian Gulf to ports on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula–gas can’t, meaning there are no alternative routes to get LNG to Asia if Hormuz is blocked. Qatar, one of the world’s leading producers of LNG, is trying to find some way to keep its export routes open, through diplomacy, finding new customers, and taking rare opportunities to get their product through Hormuz. It has also set up a fast recovery timeline so it can restart production once the strait reopens. Things didn’t collapse as analysts feared at the beginning of the conflict. In April, for example, the head of the International Energy Agency predicted that flights may soon need to be grounded in Europe due to jet fuel shortages. While oil prices did surge to as high as $126 per barrel, they didn’t hit the $150 to $200 a barrel level that some analysts feared. And while several Asian countries imposed emergency measures to conserve fuel, a lengthy and catastrophic shortage never materialized. “The global market is proving to be more resilient to major supply shocks than many thought,” Kavonic says. One reason was the sheer amount of oil sitting in reserve. The IEA mandates that its 32 member countries stockpile at least 90 days’ worth of oil; similar mandates for gas stockpiles were imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March, the agency coordinated the release of 400 million barrels from these emergency oil stockpiles, the largest such intervention in its history. Oil producers like the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE also increased their production and carrying capacity. Yet perhapsthe unsung heroin the market was China, which drew on its huge stockpiles, leaving more oil in the market for other economies. “OPEC has lost its primary role as global oil market manager,” Kavonic says, referring to the cartel that tries to maintain the global prices of oil. “It’s now moved to China.” He notes that China’s increased leverage in oil markets will have repercussions throughout the Pacific. “We can see how dependent Pacific Islandnations are on diesel to keep the lights on. So we’ve seen countries in Asia not just have to manage their own imports but support the Pacific as well. Otherwise 30 years of Pacific policy could be undermined in a few months.” But how long this will last is unclear, particularly now that tensions between Iran and the U.S. have flared up again, and a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz now looks likely. “We spent the last four months living on theoil market credit card. And if we continue at that rate, that credit card will be maxed out in a few months,” Kavonic says. Fortune will host several sessions on what a more complicated geopolitical world means for Asia’s businesses at the upcoming Fortune Leaders Forum, hosted in Macau on Sep. 8.Learn more here. TheFortune Leaders Forumwill convene Fortune 500 executives and founders of leading Asian companies to help define the future of leadership in an age of convergence and complexity.September 8 in Macau.Apply here.

(ANSA) - TOKYO, 24 AGO - La Borsa di Tokyo avvia la prima seduta della settimana all'insegna della cautela, a fronte del rialzo dei rendimenti sul mercato obbligazionario a livello globale, mentre rimangono le incognite sui negoziati in corso tra Iran e Stati Uniti per il mantenimento della tregua nel conflitto in Medio Oriente, e la riapertura dello Stretto di Hormuz. In apertura il listino di riferimento Nikkei segna una variazione appena positiva dello 0,12% a quota 66.097,62, con un guadagno di 81 punti. Sul mercato valutario lo yen rimane debole sul dollaro a un valore di 158,80 e sull'euro a 185,50. (ANSA).

TOKYO: The Global Ro-Ro Community (GRC)*1, whose participants include Ro-Ro carriers and other stakeholders, and which covers approximately 80% of the transport capacity of the global car carrier fleet*2, has established theGRC Council (GRCC),a body responsible for the operation of the GRC. Since the establishment of the GRC,ClassNKhas participated as an independent verifier. In connection with the establishment of the GRCC, ClassNK has also contributed to the development of its operational foundation through the formulation of the Governance Framework and data handling rules. With the establishment of the GRCC, a formal governance framework has been put in place for the continuous review and improvement of emissions accounting methodologies and data handling rules. This will strengthen the environment in which not only Ro-Ro carriers, but also cargo owners and vehicle manufacturers, can utilize reliable and transparent GHG emissions data. As a result, emissions management and decarbonization efforts throughout the supply chain can be advanced more effectively. In addition, the continuous improvement of internationally aligned emissions accounting methodologies is expected to enhance the transparency of environmental information and promote decarbonization across the industry. ClassNK will continue to support decarbonization efforts of shipping companies, cargo owners, vehicle manufacturers, and other stakeholders through the promotion of emissions accounting based on reliable primary data, drawing on its expertise and experience as an independent verifier. Background to the Establishment of the GRCC Growing demand for reliable primary emissions data is being driven by developments such as FuelEU Maritime, the IMO’s greenhouse gas reduction measures, and the advancement of corporate Scope 3 emissions disclosure requirements. Against this background, the GRC was established in 2024 to promote cross-industry collaboration between Ro-Ro carriers and cargo owners. The GRC brings together Ro-Ro carriers, independent verifiers, cargo owners and other stakeholders to improve the accuracy, transparency and comparability of greenhouse gas emissions accounting. Participating companies account for approximately 80% of the transport capacity of the global car carrier fleet and are working to establish an industry-wide emissions data platform. As these activities have expanded, the maintenance and improvement of the methodology, the management of data handling rules, and the transparency of decision-making processes have become increasingly important challenges. As a self-governing organization of carriers and verifiers, the GRCC is responsible for the ongoing review and enhancement of the GRC Methodology*3, data handling rules and related governance documents. Through these efforts, the GRCC is expected to contribute to carriers’ communication of environmental performance and to support more effective Scope 3 emissions management and enhanced decarbonization strategies such as by cargo owners and vehicle manufacturers, while also improving the transparency of environmental information throughout the supply chain. ClassNK’s Role Since the establishment of the GRC, ClassNK has served as an independent verifier and provides verification services for GHG emissions data in accordance with the GRC Methodology. By supporting transparent and consistent emissions accounting based on verified primary data, ClassNK contributes to the development of a trusted emissions data foundation for the Ro-Ro sector. In preparation for the establishment of the GRCC, ClassNK participated in the development of the GRC Governance Framework and data handling rules and supported the preparation of related maritime legal documentation. Furthermore,Mr. Hiroshi Ochi, General Manager, Green Certification Department, ClassNKhas been elected Vice-Chair of the GRCC, among other contributions made by ClassNK toward the establishment and operation of the new governance framework. *1 A programme established by Smart Freight Centre (SFC), an international non-profit organization dedicated to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the logistics sector. The GRC brings together Ro-Ro carriers, independent verifiers, cargo owners and other stakeholders to improve the accuracy, transparency and comparability of greenhouse gas emissions accounting. *2 Based on Car Equivalent Units (CEU) *3 A GHG emissions accounting methodology for Ro-Ro shipping published by the GRC in 2025. The methodology is aligned with ISO 14083 and the GLEC Framework and enables the calculation of vessel-level GHG emission intensity factors based on independently verified primary data.

TOKYO:ClassNKhas revised the safety requirements for ships using methanol/ethanol and hydrogen as fuel within the‘Guidelines for Ships Using Alternative Fuels (Edition 3.1).’ In Part D, covering hydrogen-fueled ships, the revision incorporates the ‘Interim Guidelines for the Safety of Ships Using Hydrogen as Fuel (MSC.1/Circ.1701)’ issued by the IMO this year, and additionally introduces a hydrogen leak frequency table that can be used for the safety assessments required under the IMO guidelines. In Part A, covering methanol/ethanol-fueled ships, new structural strength requirements for methanol/ethanol fuel tanks—which are not addressed in the IMO guidelines—have been established. Through this revision, shipyards, designers, and shipowners can carry out design and safety assessments in line with the latest international standards, and by utilizing ClassNK’s own leak frequency estimates and the relevant requirements, they can proceed the development of alternative-fueled ships in a more rationally. Background As the building of alternative-fueled ships advances in response to the global challenge of reducing GHG emissions, ClassNK has comprehensively compiled the safety requirements for ships using methanol, ethanol, LPG, ammonia, and hydrogen—fuels regarded as promising alternatives—and has issued the guidelines. Taking into account the risks that the use of alternative fuels poses to the environment, seafarers, and ships, the guidelines set out requirements for equipment, controls, and safety devices to minimize such risks. With the issuance of the IMO guidelines for hydrogen-fueled ships (MSC.1/Circ.1701), ClassNK has fully incorporated the IMO guidelines to make the guidelines more user-friendly for shipyards, designers, and shipowners, while also enhancing the requirements serving as design and assessment guidance for other alternative fuels. In the development of the IMO guidelines, now reflected in Part D, ClassNK participated as a member of the Japanese delegation to the IMO Sub-Committee CCC 11*¹ and contributed to the discussions. Examples of Revisions As a third-party certification body, ClassNK will continue to support your efforts to address environmental challenges through the development of standards, certification, and the provision of information. How to access the guidelines The guidelines can be viewed under “Guidelines” on My Page by registering as a user on the ClassNK website (URL:www.classnk.or.jp). My Page can be accessedhere. *1 Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers At CCC 11, the 11th session of the Sub-Committee of IMO held in September 2025, the Interim Guidelines for the Safety of Ships Using Hydrogen as Fuel (MSC.1/Circ.1701) were finalized. *2 Related press release: ClassNK releases ‘Guidelines for Ships Using Alternative Fuels (Edition2.0)’ -adding specific safety requirements for ammonia-fueled ships- https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/en/news.aspx?id=8242&layout=1&type=p *3 A statistical method that combines the likelihood of newly observed data with known information (the prior distribution) to update and infer a target probability as a probability distribution (the posterior distribution). *4 Guidelines for the safety of ships using methanol/ethanol as fuel, issued by the IMO in 2020.

French-based engineering player Technip Energies has been tasked with front-end engineering design (FEED) work for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project off the coast of Malaysia, enabling it to bring to life Southeast Asia’s next LNG regasification terminal. Technip Energies has secured a FEED contract for the offshore regasification terminal (RGT)Yanproject in Kedah, northwest Malaysia. This project is being jointly developed byGas Malaysia,Tokyo Gas Asia, andVTTI. The estimated project costs are expected to be RM2 billion–RM3 billion ($490 million-$735 million). “This RGT Yan project will introduce a new LNG entry point in the northern region of Peninsular Malaysia, strengthening the resilience and flexibility of the country’s natural gas supply, supporting growing industrial and power demand, and contributing to energy security across the region,”highlighted the French player. The European firm’s scope of work includes evaluating best regasification terminal configurations before completing the full FEED for the selected solution, establishing the project’s technical basis and supporting its progression toward a final investment decision (FID). Since Gas Malaysia, as the lead project developer,received a letter to proceed (LTP)from Malaysia’s Energy Commission in March 2026 for RGT Yan, the project was cleared to advance into further implementation work, including engineering, financing, and site-preparation activities. This content is available after accepting the cookies. Clearance in place for work on Southeast Asian FSRU to move forward The Malaysian firm signed a joint development agreement (JDA) with Tokyo Gas and VTTI in May 2026. While Gas Malaysia is the project lead and sponsor during the development phase, the partners will undertake technical studies, commercial negotiations, regulatory work, and project management ahead of FID. With a capacity of 6 million tons per annum (mtpa), the terminal will comprise an offshore floating LNG storage and regasification (FSRU), marine infrastructure, a subsea gas pipeline, and an onshore receiving facility. The latest FEED award comes less than three months after Technip Energiesreceived full notice to proceed (FNTP)with an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC)contractfor theCommonwealth LNGexport facilityin Louisiana. Take the spotlight and anchor your brand in the heart of the offshore world! Join us for a bigger impact and amplify your presence at the core hub of the offshore energy community!

The maritime transport sector supports 16 to 18 million people across global, regional and domestic supply chains in East Asia and the Pacific. According to the World Bank, ocean shipping moves essential bulk goods, consumer products and energy resources across archipelagos and major economic corridors. The region faces mounting pressure from port congestion, ageing vessels and safety deficiencies. Building resilient supply chains requires efficiency, safety and long-term environmental sustainability, according to the latest World Bank report, Ports, Ships and Fuels: Maritime Efficiency, Safety and Sustainability in East Asia and Pacific. Procurement decisions for new propulsion systems remain highly sensitive tofuelprice competitiveness. According to the report, bunker fuels represent 40 to 60% of vessel operating costs. Long-term environmental sustainability relies on transitioning away from conventional fossil fuels, which currently account for more than 99% of global marine fuel consumption. Procurement of alternativefuelsfaces severe structural bottlenecks. According to the World Bank, green methanol projects currently produce only 0.034 million tonnes, while 13.2 million tonnes remain at the feasibility stage. Maritime operators must compete for green ammonia with the agricultural and chemical manufacturing sectors. These industries consume more than 181 million tonnes annually and can easily absorb higher price premiums. Although Liquefied Natural Gas leads alternative deployments, with more than 470 vessels in service, achieving net zero targets requires scaling up green methanol and green ammonia. The World Bank states that transparent regulatory signals and unified global standards are urgently needed to de-risk investments in dual-fuel shipbuilding, green fuel production and regional bunkering infrastructure. Handling hazardous fuels such as green methanol and green ammonia poses severe operational risks, including extreme toxicity and flammability. These require advanced gas-detection infrastructure, protective equipment and specialised emergency response training. Transforming regional maritime networks into cleantransportcorridors demands substantial capital investment across ports, ships and energy supply chains. Between 2025 and 2040, modernising port infrastructure will require roughly US$180bn, while domestic and regional fleet replacement will require more than US$280bn. Developing supporting fuel production infrastructure by 2040 will require further capital outlays. According to the report, this is estimated at US$310bn for green ammonia, US$81bn for green methanol and US$42bn for renewable Liquefied Natural Gas. Extending efficiency improvements across all subsectors and scales of operation is essential to unlock broader productivity, safety and sustainability benefits. Public-private partnerships and blended finance mechanisms could de-risk capital-intensive projects, including portelectrificationand onshore power supply installations. Coordinated policy frameworks must align institutional governance with sustainable procurement practices across raw material suppliers, vessel owners and terminal operators. Investing in port productivity and green energy yields socio-economic benefits. According to the World Bank, every additional million tonnes of cargo throughput supports approximately 300 jobs across hinterland logistics networks. Oceanshippingremains the most energy-efficient mode of transport, emitting 11 to 17 grams of CO₂ per ton-nautical mile. According to the report, this compares with 70 grams for heavy road freight and up to 515 grams for aviation. Between 2008 and 2024, globalshippingtrade expanded by nearly 50%. However, energy use grew by only 5%, saving 1.8m barrels of oil daily and US$60bn annually in fuel costs. Port operations in developing regional economies generate approximately 21.5 million tonnes of CO₂e emissions. According to the World Bank, ships account for 70 to 95% of air pollution within port perimeters. "Maritime supply chains are the circulatory system of regional economies," says Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Vice President for East Asia and Pacific at the World Bank. "When they function well, businesses become more competitive, markets become more accessible and communities prosper. This report is a call to protect workers, strengthen maritime safety and seize the opportunities presented by a more efficient and sustainable maritime future." Regional domestic fleets suffer from safety gaps. According to the report, 28% of vessels are more than 20 years old and 18% exceed 25 years, increasing the likelihood of inefficient fuel use and incidents. Port State Control inspections under the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding conducted more than 32,000 vessel checks in 2024. These resulted in nearly 1,200 detentions due to critical safety or environmental deficiencies. The World Bank states that because the region supplies more than 40% of the world's seafarer workforce, structured training and rigorous crew certification are vital to mitigate human error. These safety requirements become more critical as fleets transition to alternative fuels. At major gateways such as Shanghai and Singapore, short turnaround times strengthen manufacturing supply networks. According to the report, small archipelagic terminals struggle with slow cargo handling and extended ship wait times, which could affect procurement lead times across supply chains. Vice President for East Asia and Pacific

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (9107.T) announced on the 9th that its group company Daito Corporation (Minato-ku, Tokyo), which operates a tugboat business, has decided to build a second electric tugboat. The vessel is a large 260-gross-ton class ship, and to handle a wide range of tugboat operations within Tokyo Bay, it will be equipped with a high-output 4,400-horsepower motor, exceeding that of the first vessel. Completion is scheduled for July 2028, marking a move to elevate the accelerating decarbonization trend in the maritime shipping industry to a concrete implementation phase. The construction of this second vessel has been selected for a subsidy program jointly administered by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, titled the "Project to Promote Innovative Operational Efficiency and Non-Fossil Energy Conversion for Coastal Vessels." Kawasaki Heavy Industries (7012.T) and Toa Corporation (1885.T) are also participating in the project framework, aiming to establish a standard model for electric tugboats. The newly built electric tugboat will be a 260-gross-ton class vessel, designed for full-scale tugboat operations within Tokyo Bay. Its most significant feature is the adoption of a DC power distribution system that can supply electricity efficiently. This has enabled the installation of a 4,400-horsepower motor, significantly surpassing the 199-gross-ton first vessel (3,600 horsepower) ordered in 2024. The propulsion system ordered this time by Kawasaki Heavy Industries integrates a suite of equipment including a 3.2-megawatt-hour large-capacity lithium-ion battery, a high-output motor, and a screw propeller. The company stated it "aims for performance that can be used in the same way as a tugboat powered by a typical diesel engine," emphasizing a design philosophy that does not sacrifice operational capability through electrification. Daito Corporation positions this second vessel as the standard model for future electric tugboats. Kawasaki Heavy Industries also intends to expand external sales of this system as a standard model. Construction of the second vessel will be handled by Honwara Shipbuilding (Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture). Based in Hiroshima Prefecture, the company has a track record in building coastal vessels and is entering the new field of electric ships. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which plays the core role in the propulsion and control system, received the order as an integrated system encompassing lithium-ion batteries, motors, and screw propellers. This marks the company's second order for an electric tugboat propulsion system, following the first vessel (199 tons) in 2024. The design and construction of onshore power supply equipment will be handled by Toa Corporation. The practical application of electric tugboats requires the development of high-output charging infrastructure at ports, and the expertise of Toa Corporation, which has extensive experience in quay wall construction and similar projects, will be utilized. This project has been selected as a subsidy recipient for the "Project to Promote Innovative Operational Efficiency and Non-Fossil Energy Conversion for Coastal Vessels," a collaborative effort between Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. Decarbonization of coastal shipping is one of the key areas for achieving the Japanese government's 2050 carbon neutrality goal, and the demonstration and introduction of electric tugboats is positioned as a concrete measure toward this end. As momentum for reducing environmental impact grows across the maritime shipping industry, tugboats operating within ports are considered highly compatible with electrification. This is because they primarily navigate relatively short distances and can easily secure power supply from onshore sources. With the decision to build a second vessel following the first, the Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha group aims to solidify its leading position in the practical application and dissemination of electric tugboats. The introduction schedule for Daito Corporation's electric tugboats is as follows: The decision to build this second vessel can be seen as a symbolic example indicating that the electric ship market is transitioning from the demonstration phase to a full-scale introduction phase. As indicated by Kawasaki Heavy Industries' statement that it "aims to expand external sales as a standard model," electric propulsion systems hold the potential to become a new revenue source for shipbuilding and marine equipment manufacturers. Furthermore, the operation of an electric tugboat in Tokyo Bay, Japan's largest port area, is expected to have a ripple effect on other port operators and shipping companies. For Toa Corporation, which is responsible for onshore power supply equipment, this also serves as a foothold into a new business area: adapting port infrastructure for electrification. On the other hand, whether performance equivalent to a diesel engine can be achieved will largely depend on future demonstrations. Tugboats, in particular, are commercial vessels requiring instantaneous power and high reliability, and addressing challenges such as operational costs, charging time, and battery degradation due to electrification will be key to widespread adoption. Once added, BigGo Finance appears first in Google Search Top Stories, so you get the broadest, most up-to-the-minute, and most comprehensive global financial news first. Follow the three steps to link a messaging app like Telegram or LINE, and get schedule notifications pushed to you automatically

Compartir en redes sociales El armador no operador Nissen Kaiun recibió el portacontenedores “Maersk Tokyo”, de 8.906 TEUs, construido por el astillero japonés Japan Marine United (JMU). El nuevo buque es el primero de una serie de 12 portacontenedores de combustible dual metanol ordenados por diversos armadores asiáticos a JMU en tres etapas (enero de 2023, septiembre de 2024 y enero de 2026), todos destinados a operar bajo contratos de fletamento de largo plazo para Maersk, reportaAlphaliner. Tras abandonar el astillero, el “Maersk Tokyo” arribó a Busan el 24 de junio, desde donde se incorporará al servicio Asia–Costa Oeste de Sudamérica ‘AC-3’ de Maersk. La nave presenta dimensiones compactas para su capacidad, con 100.000 dwt, 277 metros de eslora y 45,8 metros de manga, equivalente a 18 filas de contenedores. Aunque no ha sido confirmado oficialmente, se estima que contará con una capacidad cercana a 1.000 conexiones para contenedoresreefer. Por MundoMaritimo CMA CGM apuesta por la descarbonización de su flota con órdenes de buques de combustible dual metanol y GNL Maersk recibe al "Alexandra" de 16.592 TEUs y combustible dual, apto para ser propulsado por metanol Maersk recibe el mayor portacontenedores de combustible dual de su flota 3721compañías registradas,51países,83empresas patrocinadas Agencias de Aduana Agencias Navieras Almacenamiento y Bodegaje Astilleros Compañías Navieras Consultores Marítimos Embarcadores Empresas Portuarias y Terminales Marítimos Equipos Naúticos Estiba y Desestiba Exportadores Importadores Ingeniería, Certificación e Inspección Organizaciones Otras Pesqueros Repuestos y Accesorios Terminales Terrestres y Aeroportuarios Transporte Aéreo Transporte Terrestre Turismo La política que en el presente documento se indica, tiene por objeto informar a los usuarios deMundoMaritimosobre el proceder de nuestra empresa respecto del tratamiento de los datos de carácter personal recogidos a través de nuestros portales. 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Nei primi tre mesi dell’anno i volumi calano leggermente, con esportazioni in crescita e importazioni più deboli. Aumenta la movimentazione di container vuoti Tokyo – Il porto di Tokyo ha chiuso il primo trimestre del 2026 con un andamento sostanzialmente stabile dei traffici container, pur registrando una lieve flessione rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno precedente. Secondo i dati preliminari diffusi dall’Ufficio Portuale e Marittimo del Governo Metropolitano di Tokyo, tra gennaio e marzo sono stati movimentati complessivamente 802.330 teu di container pieni, in calo dello 0,8%, mentre i container vuoti sono aumentati dell’1,9%, raggiungendo 351.237 teu. Nel solo comparto del commercio estero, il porto ha gestito 750.188 teu di container pieni, in lieve diminuzione (-0,4%), e 276.773 teu di container vuoti, in crescita del 7,1%, segnale di un’intensa attività di riposizionamento delle attrezzature. Sul fronte delle esportazioni, il trimestre si è chiuso con risultati positivi: i container pieni sono aumentati dell’1,5%, raggiungendo 187.753 teu, mentre quelli vuoti sono cresciuti dell’8,1%. Più debole invece l’andamento delle importazioni, con i container pieni in calo dell’1% a 562.435 teu e una marcata riduzione dei container vuoti, diminuiti del 47,6%. Anche il traffico domestico ha registrato una contrazione, con 52.142 teu di container pieni (-6,2%) e 74.464 teu di container vuoti (-13,7%). I dati di marzo confermano il quadro emerso nel trimestre: il porto ha movimentato 353.773 TEU di container destinati al commercio estero (-0,8%), con una crescita delle esportazioni che non è stata sufficiente a compensare il rallentamento delle importazioni. Nel complesso, i risultati del primo trimestre evidenziano un porto che mantiene volumi elevati in un contesto di mercato ancora incerto. La tenuta dell’export e l’aumento della movimentazione dei container vuoti indicano una rete logistica ancora dinamica, mentre la debolezza delle importazioni riflette un rallentamento della domanda interna e un contesto commerciale internazionale che continua a mostrare segnali di cautela.

TOKYO, June 27, 2026 - (JCN Newswire) -Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., a part of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Group, has received an order from Hitachi Zosen Marine Engine Co., Ltd. (HZME) for its MAmmoSS® ammonia fuel handling system.(1) HZME is a dual licensee(2) of Everllence SE and WinGD, major licensors(3) of marine engines. MAmmoSS® will be designed and optimized to be compatible with the ammonia marine engines of these two licensors, and after delivery to HZME's facility, will be used for shop tests of both engines. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has been engaged in ongoing discussions on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping. The MEPC 80 session adopted the 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, which aims to reach net-zero GHG emissions from international shipping by 2050, while MEPC 83 approved mid-term measures to reduce GHG emissions. Decarbonization in global shipping is a critical issue, and ammonia, which does not emit CO2 when burned, is attracting attention as a next-generation marine fuel that will significantly contribute to reducing GHG emissions in the shipping industry. However, as ammonia is a toxic fluid, safe handling technology onboard ships is essential and is expected to drive demand for MAmmoSS®. Going forward, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding will continue to provide safe and reliable products for ammonia-fueled vessels to support the expected market expansion, while also enhancing functionality and deliver greater value to meet the diverse needs of customers. (1) The Mitsubishi Ammonia Supply and Safety System (MAmmoSS®) consists of an Ammonia Fuel Supply System (AFSS) and an Ammonia Gas Abatement System (AGAS), along with control equipment to integrate and regulate these systems. "MAmmoSS®" is a registered trademark of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in Japan and other countries.(2) Licensee: A company authorized to use designs or technologies(3) Licensor: A company that grants permission to use designs or technologies MAmmoSS® modules (image) About MHI Group Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Group is one of the world’s leading industrial groups, spanning energy, smart infrastructure, industrial machinery, aerospace and defense. MHI Group combines cutting-edge technology with deep experience to deliver innovative, integrated solutions that help to realize a carbon neutral world, improve the quality of life and ensure a safer world. For more information, please visitwww.mhi.comor follow our insights and stories onspectra.mhi.com. Copyright © 2026 ACN Newswire. All rights reserved. A division of Asia Corporate News Network.

Press Information SHARE ・ System for shop test of ammonia marine engines・ Compatible with ammonia marine engines from major licensors Everllence SE and WinGD Tokyo, June 26, 2026 - Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., a part of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Group, has received an order from Hitachi Zosen Marine Engine Co., Ltd. (HZME) for its MAmmoSS® ammonia fuel handling system.(Note1) HZME is a dual licensee(Note2) of Everllence SE and WinGD, major licensors(Note3) of marine engines. MAmmoSS® will be designed and optimized to be compatible with the ammonia marine engines of these two licensors, and after delivery to HZME's facility, will be used for shop tests of both engines. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has been engaged in ongoing discussions on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping. The MEPC 80 session adopted the 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, which aims to reach net-zero GHG emissions from international shipping by 2050, while MEPC 83 approved mid-term measures to reduce GHG emissions. Decarbonization in global shipping is a critical issue, and ammonia, which does not emit CO2when burned, is attracting attention as a next-generation marine fuel that will significantly contribute to reducing GHG emissions in the shipping industry. However, as ammonia is a toxic fluid, safe handling technology onboard ships is essential and is expected to drive demand for MAmmoSS®. Going forward, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding will continue to provide safe and reliable products for ammonia-fueled vessels to support the expected market expansion, while also enhancing functionality and deliver greater value to meet the diverse needs of customers. MAmmoSS® modules (image) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Group is one of the world’s leading industrial groups, spanning energy, smart infrastructure, industrial machinery, aerospace and defense. MHI Group combines cutting-edge technology with deep experience to deliver innovative, integrated solutions that help to realize a carbon neutral world, improve the quality of life and ensure a safer world. For more information, please visitwww.mhi.comor follow our insights and stories onspectra.mhi.com.

This article saved into your bookmarks. Click here to view your bookmarks. In this episode ofThe Dialectic, Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, analyze the postwar trajectory of Japan, the land of the rising sun. Japan has evolved economically, demographically, politically and militarily since World War II. For decades after 1945, Japan was a passive international actor. Since the rise of Junichiro Koizumi to power in 2001, Japan has become a more assertive “middle power.” Of course, this massive transformation of the country has also caused massive challenges. Over the last three decades, Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has increased massively. In 1991, this figure sat at around 65%. By 2025–2026, that figure has risen to 248%. This is the biggest debt burden in the developed world. This debt spike is partly a result of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 Covid pandemic. Mostly, however, it is because Japan has run consistent government budget deficits. Luckily for Japan, however, 88% of the debt is owed to the Japanese people, not to foreign investors. It is denominated in yen, and interest rates are low or zero. So, unlike a country that has borrowed from outside in dollars, Japan does not face the same risk of financial crises. Still, this massive debt is a burden, and it has slowed down Japan’s growth rate. This is a significant shift from Japan’s postwar economic miracle. From the 1950s to 1973, Japan sustained rapid growth, often exceeding 10% annually. Growth onlyslowedafter the 1973 oil crisis, becoming more sporadic during the 1980s before settling into stagnation (known as the “Lost Decades”) after Japan’s asset bubble burst in 1990. Since the bubble burst, the purchasing power of the yen has declined steadily. The yen has depreciated significantly. In April 1995, $1 was worth ¥83.6895, while by May 5, 2026, $1 was equivalent to ¥157.74. Economists still puzzle over the question of what caused Japan’s decline. The “economic miracle” of the land of the rising sun feels a long way away in the country with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the developed world. Atul believes that Japan’s economic policies of the 1980s fueled an unsustainable bubble. Tokyo focused on the marketability of assets, eased access to credit and encouraged speculation, prolonging and exacerbating the bubble. At the peak of Japan’s economic bubble, around 1989 or 1990, economists estimated the theoretical land value of the Tokyo Imperial Palace grounds to be greater than the value of all real estate in the entire state of California. This represented one of the largest asset bubbles in history. Tokyo real estate was priced over 350 times higher than equivalent space in Manhattan. There were real fears in America that Japan was a real threat to the US. The 1993 movieRising Suncaptured these fears. Many argued that the US had to adapt and adopt Japanese methods. A real estate developer called Donald Trump spoke out against Japan for stealing American jobs and ruining the country’s economy. Neither the central bank nor the finance ministry acted in time to contain the bubble. By August 1990, the Nikkei stock index had plummeted to half its peak by the time of the fifth monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan. By late 1991, other asset prices began to fall. Even though asset prices had visibly collapsed by early 1992, the economy’s decline continued for well over a decade. Not only has Japan changed economically, but it has also changed politically. Japan and Germany were the two great losers of World War II. Both had their militarism and even nationalism beaten out of them. The US turned both countries into loyal allies and changed their culture. Both turned away from far-right political parties to focus on economic and social advancement. Complete defeat in World War II rejected, suppressed or placed into question all the cultural guideposts for Japanese society. America set out to remake the Japanese political system in its image explicitly and achieved dramatic success. The American occupier suppressed the Japanese nationalist right because it was responsible for a brutal war and a complete defeat. Yet Japanese society remained conservative. In 1955, Japan’s two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party, merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a center-right, united front against the Japan Socialist Party. The key LDP argument was that it represented Japan while the socialist report to Moscow. General Douglas MacArthur wanted to ensure Japan did not turn communist. So, it made peace with Japan’s ruling elite, which formed and dominated the LDP. Unsurprisingly, the LDP went on to become the ruling party of Japan, retaining power uninterruptedly for decades. It presided over the economic miracle and won election after election. The LDP only lost power briefly when the Japanese asset bubble burst and damaged its sheen. In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, a member of the Japanese political elite, won the LDP presidency and then became prime minister. He was a reformer who revived the fortunes of the LDP. Koizumi was focused on reducing Japan’s government debt, privatizing Japan Post in the process. He was also an advocate of a more muscular foreign policy and won international attention for sending Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to Iraq after George W. Bush’s invasion of the country in 2003. This was the first time Tokyo had deployed troops outside Japan since World War II. Koizumi was also a strong nationalist who visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, fueling diplomatic tensions with neighboring China and South Korea. Koizumi resigned as prime minister in 2006 and was succeeded by Shinzo Abe. Although Abe lost power after a year, he made a comeback later and went on to become the longest-serving Japanese prime minister. He tried to counter Japan’s stagnation through Abenomics, a combination of monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms, which had mixed results. More importantly, Abe steered Japan to a more nationalist and muscular foreign policy. In 2007, Abe initiated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), involving the US, Australia, India and Japan, to contain the rise of China. Abe was also a member of Nippon Kaigi, a far-right organization that downplays Japanese atrocities in textbooks and denies use of Korean or Chinese comfort women for Japanese troops during World War II. In a nutshell, Abe was the key figure in the public emergence of Japanese nationalism. Today, his disciple Sanae Takaichi has become the first female prime minister of Japan. Just as Abe was more nationalist than Koizumi, Takaichi is more nationalist than Abe. Unlike the patricians Koizumi and Abe, Takaichi is of humble middle-class origin. In keeping with the Japanese conservative tradition, Takaichi also opposes immigration. She also wants to beef up Japan’s military. As China has become more nationalistic and threatening in recent years, Japan has become more independent and assertive. The fetters once put on by Americans after World War II are now coming loose. In Atul’s words, “Both Germany and Japan, in some ways, are normalizing and reverting back to historical mean.” While politics might have changed gradually, Japan’s demography has changed dramatically. The Japanese fertility rate dropped to 1.15 in 2024, far below the 2.1, well below replacement level. The 65+ form around 30% of the population. The working age population between 15 and 64 is about 59%. The youth, those below 14, are only 11%. The median age is 49.4 to 50.2 (second highest after Monaco), life expectancy 81 for men and 87–88 for women. The highest total dependency ratio is 70.2, i.e. there are 100 workers for 70 dependents, which include the old and the young. This ratio is the highest in the world. During the postwar boom of 1950, there were over 12 workers for every retiree. This massive workforce kept the tax burden low and productivity high. Japanese demography fueled the rapid industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s. Note that Japanese workers were educated and skilled unlike their counterparts in India or Pakistan. As Japan grew richer, birth rates fell and life expectancy rose. By 1970, the worker-to-pensioner ratio was 9.8-to-1. By 1990, this ratio was 5.8-to-1, which declined to 2.8-to-1 by 2010. Today, this ratio is 2-to-1. There is no precedent for the dramatic aging of the Japanese population and slower growth is to some degree a result of lower birth rates. Older people do not work or consume as much as young people. Japan is now a “super-aging” society. Japan’s current population is estimated to be122 millionin 2026. Projections indicate that it will plunge to105 millionby 2050. Japan has been a socially conservative society and has been reluctant to let large numbers of foreigners immigrate to their island nation. China has become increasingly aggressive and nationalistic even as the US has become more isolationist. Trump walked out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), leaving the field open to China in the region. Beijing came up with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which many Asian countries signed after the collapse of the TPP. In the US/Israel–Iran War, American redeployment of troops and military kit from Japan and South Korea to the Middle East has worried both Tokyo and Seoul. Consequently, Japan is adapting to changed circumstances. Japan has moved to replace, to the extent possible, American international economic leadership in Asia. Tokyo has replaced the TPP and countered the RCEP with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known asTPP-11. Japan has also directed tens of billions of dollars to African development in an effort to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other African investments. In the changed strategic environment. Japan has doubled its defense budget. Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas and around the Senkaku Islands (known to China as the Diaoyu Islands) off the shore of Taiwan makes Japan uncomfortable. They also worry about a 2021 circumnavigation of Japan by a Chinese–Russian fleet. These threats have come at a time when North Korea continues to develop and test nuclear missiles. Japan now finds itself in a position where it cannot just rely on a defensive posture but has to project force. At the end of December, 2025, the Japanese cabinet approved a $640 million defense budget, which includes the purchase of 300 US Tomahawk missiles and the development of a rapid reaction force similar to the US Marines. This force is capable of projecting power beyond simply defending the home islands. Japan has also engaged in strong bilateral discussions with Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia, and continues to engage with the US. Despite a more robust foreign policy and increased defense capabilities, Japan lacks the size to take on either the US or China. Over the next few years, Japan will continue to slide slowly to middle-rank power status. Going forward, Japan will seek to fill the gaps left by America’s isolationist policies with variable coalitions to counterbalance China, though this has significant limits. The QUAD hasn’t met Japanese expectations. Thus, Japan has been deepening relationships with South Korea and Taiwan. Japan’s grand strategy will be to contain and deter China. Fighting or boycotting China would lead to economic armageddon. China’s fixation with historic Japanese militarism is the result of Xi Jinping’s obsession. Atul points out that no Japanese army can march all the way to India as it did in World War II. The Japanese simply do not have the numbers. Over time, Japan, South Korea and China will have similar challenges of aging societies and a detente makes most sense. In the coming years, Japan’s economy will suffer from aging pains. The nation has three possibilities to counter a declining and aging population: significantly increase immigration to keep its population numbers up, invest massively in robotics to automate work or accept economic stagnation despite technological leadership. Japan is debating the first option, but so far has chosen not to allow massive immigration. It has embraced the second wholeheartedly. The third is inevitable. Japan will have to face an existential choice in the next 25 years: accept China’s strategic and economic orbit; maintain a counteralliance with the US and other regional actors; or create a replacement, to the extent possible, for Pax Americana in Asia. This will involve not just an entente with other Asian states but also a detente with China based on the economic benefits of a peaceful China–Japan relationship. A more multipolar and uncertain Pax Asiana is likely to succeed Pax Americana in Asia. [Lee Thompson-KolarandCheyenne Torreswrote this summary.] The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. Please read our commenting guidelinesbefore commenting. 1. Be Respectful: Please be polite to the author. Avoid hostility. The whole point of Fair Observer is openness to different perspectives from perspectives from around the world. 2. Comment Thoughtfully: Please be relevant and constructive. We do not allow personal attacks, disinformation or trolling. We will remove hate speech or incitement. 3. Contribute Usefully: Add something of value — a point of view, an argument, a personal experience or a relevant link if you are citing statistics and key facts. Please agree to the guidelines before proceeding. In this episode of The Dialectic, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle explain how India’s current leader has rolled back the... Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan in response to a parliamentary question have triggered a furious response from... In this episode of The Dialectic, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine France’s deepening polycrisis. Rising debt, political paralysis and... In this episode of The Dialectic, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle explore how Germany faces acute economic, political and social... In this episode of The Dialectic, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine Europe’s rise from Renaissance brilliance to post-World War... 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L'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong continua a diffondere informazioni a comandanti, membri dell'equipaggio, armatori, gestori e operatori navali in merito al diritto marittimo vietnamita, ai trattati marittimi internazionali di cui il Vietnam è firmatario e ad altri trattati marittimi internazionali. Allo stesso tempo, promuove misure di sicurezza contro la pirateria, normative sul rispetto dei limiti di contenuto di zolfo nel combustibile e normative sull'installazione di sistemi di trattamento delle acque di zavorra per le navi che operano su rotte internazionali all'interno delle acque del porto di Hai Phong. Secondo Bui Nguyen Khoi, direttore dell'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong , nel 2026 l'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong continuerà a promuovere lo spirito di solidarietà e unità; a rafforzare il ruolo di leadership del Comitato del Partito e l'efficacia della gestione governativa; e a coordinarsi strettamente con le agenzie competenti per attuare soluzioni complete volte a mantenere l'ordine e la disciplina, garantire la sicurezza marittima e prevenire l'inquinamento ambientale nell'area portuale di Hai Phong. L'ente si impegna a raggiungere in modo completo i seguenti obiettivi chiave per il 2026: un volume di merci movimentate nell'area portuale pari a 122 milioni di tonnellate; un numero di navi in ​​transito pari a 42.500; entrate derivanti dalle tasse portuali pari a 184,5 miliardi di VND; entrate derivanti dalle tasse di ingresso e uscita dal porto pari a 14,8 miliardi di VND; entrate derivanti dalle tasse per la sicurezza marittima pari a 502,6 miliardi di VND; e una riduzione degli incidenti marittimi in tutti e tre i parametri: numero di incidenti, numero di morti e numero di feriti. Contemporaneamente, l'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong ha elaborato opuscoli su argomenti specifici di gestione (navi passeggeri, estrazione di sabbia, dragaggio, ecc.) per diffondere informazioni ai comandanti delle imbarcazioni per la navigazione interna e per promuovere il contenuto del Regolamento per la prevenzione degli abbordi in mare presso gli stessi comandanti. Ha inoltre continuato a coordinarsi con l'Amministrazione marittima vietnamita per elaborare e modificare la Circolare sulle acque del porto di Hai Phong, in sostituzione della Circolare n. 23/2019/TT-BGTVT del 21 giugno 2019 del Ministero dei Trasporti (ora Ministero delle Costruzioni ) che definiva le acque portuali all'interno del territorio della città di Hai Phong e l'area di gestione dell'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong... Nel 2025, l'area portuale di Hai Phong ha continuato la sua crescita in termini di volume di merci e numero di navi in ​​entrata e in uscita dal porto. In particolare, l'apertura delle banchine 3, 4, 5 e 6 nell'area di Lach Huyen ha creato un'area portuale dinamica e molto attiva nella regione. La sicurezza marittima, la protezione e la prevenzione dell'inquinamento ambientale nell'area portuale di Hai Phong sono state prioritarie e pianificate fin dall'inizio dell'anno, attraverso compiti specifici come: l'organizzazione di ispezioni statali delle navi straniere in arrivo al porto; l'ispezione delle navi vietnamite; la verifica del rispetto della legge sulla sicurezza portuale e navale; e l'ispezione del funzionamento delle banchine, dei servizi di rimorchio, dell'approvvigionamento e dei lavori di dragaggio. Lo sviluppo di un piano annuale scientifico e l'assegnazione di responsabilità specifiche hanno permesso all'unità di attuare un lavoro completo e sistematico in materia di sicurezza, protezione e prevenzione dell'inquinamento ambientale, consolidando il suo ruolo di guida e il coordinamento con le agenzie statali specializzate nella gestione del porto. L'unità ha effettuato ispezioni portuali su 491 navi straniere in arrivo al porto; ha ispezionato 16 navi vietnamite operanti su rotte internazionali; e ha ispezionato 20 navi vietnamite operanti su rotte nazionali. L'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong ha inoltre effettuato ispezioni su 34 imbarcazioni per vie navigabili interne classificate come VR-SB. Il processo di ispezione è stato condotto da funzionari nel rigoroso rispetto dei requisiti e delle linee guida del Memorandum d'intesa di Tokyo e della Convenzione internazionale sull'ispezione delle navi, garantendo la conformità alle normative previste dalla Convenzione internazionale sulla sicurezza marittima, la sicurezza marittima, il lavoro marittimo e la prevenzione dell'inquinamento ambientale, nonché alla legislazione vietnamita; sono state individuate tempestivamente le carenze e richiesto alle imbarcazioni di porvi rimedio, assicurando che le imbarcazioni soddisfino i requisiti di sicurezza prima di lasciare il porto. Per quanto riguarda la supervisione, oltre a ispezionare le attività di costruzione e dragaggio dei progetti marittimi nell'area portuale di Hai Phong e a verificare la sicurezza del traffico sul canale marittimo di Hai Phong, l'unità partecipa regolarmente al monitoraggio delle attività di costruzione e dragaggio nell'area portuale attraverso vari mezzi, quali: il sistema VTS, il servizio di pilotaggio e le informazioni provenienti da altri enti statali di gestione del porto. Inoltre, nel suo ruolo di ente capofila che coordina le agenzie statali specializzate nella gestione del porto, l'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong mantiene regolarmente il coordinamento con la Guardia di frontiera di Hai Phong e la Polizia cittadina di Hai Phong per garantire la sicurezza e l'ordine marittimo lungo la rotta di navigazione di Hai Phong, in particolare nella risoluzione dei casi relativi all'invasione del corridoio di sicurezza marittima; e si coordina con la Dogana e la Quarantena sanitaria nella gestione delle procedure amministrative per le navi e le merci in transito nel porto di Hai Phong. Secondo Bui Nguyen Khoi, direttore dell'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong, le procedure per le navi in ​​entrata e in uscita dal porto di Hai Phong sono state riviste, riorganizzate e implementate con l'obiettivo di massimizzare l'utilizzo delle tecnologie informatiche nelle procedure navali. Di conseguenza, il processo di ricezione delle informazioni sulle navi in ​​arrivo al porto e la relativa pianificazione hanno ridotto al minimo la comunicazione tra i funzionari e il personale addetto alle procedure. Inoltre, date le limitazioni naturali dell'area portuale di Hai Phong in termini di canali di navigazione e insabbiamento naturale, l'Autorità portuale marittima di Hai Phong utilizza in modo flessibile i dati aggiornati ogni ora sulla profondità delle maree, provenienti dal misuratore di livello dell'acqua effettivo, combinati con i dati registrati dai mareografi, e si coordina con la Compagnia di pilotaggio del Nord per pianificare e gestire le procedure per l'ingresso e l'uscita in sicurezza di decine di migliaia di navi dall'area portuale di Hai Phong. Ciò crea condizioni favorevoli per le navi in ​​entrata e in uscita dall'area portuale, promuovendo un ambiente trasparente che rassicura armatori, proprietari di merci e agenti, incoraggiando la cooperazione con l'area di Hai Phong. Fonte: https://baotintuc.vn/kinh-te/nhieu-giai-phap-bao-dam-an-toan-an-ninh-hang-hai-tai-cang-bien-hai-phong-20260103174028667.htm

The recent escalation of tensions around Iran and renewed instability in the Strait of Hormuz have exposed Japan’s energy import vulnerabilities with particular clarity. Around90 to 95 percentof Japan’s crude oil imports pass through the Persian Gulf, leaving the country highly exposed to disruptions in Middle Eastern energy infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. In response, policymakers have renewed calls for expanding renewable energy, domestic energy production, and industrial decarbonization. In mid-March, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reached a$40 billionnuclear reactor agreement with the United States, while also restarting the world’s largest nuclear power station, theKashiwazaki-Kariwa plant. The crisis also highlights a more concerning contradiction: many of the supply chains underpinning Japan’s decarbonization strategy remain tied to the same vulnerable energy networks and maritime chokepoints the transition is meant to reduce dependence on. Steel sits at the center of this contradiction. Japan remains one of the world’s largest steel producers, producing80.67 million metric tonsin 2025. As outcompeting China in scale is nigh impossible, decarbonizing the sector has become a central industrial priority in an effort to both maintain competitiveness as well as to meet national decarbonization goals. Japanese steel production has traditionally relied on blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) systems, which use coal both as fuel and as a component to produce liquid iron, which is then refined into steel. These processes are highly carbon intensive, making steel an inherently challenging sector to decarbonize. The future of “green” or low emissions steel has continued to move towards electric arc furnaces (EAFs) and eventually hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (H2-DRI) systems. EAFs rely primarily on electricity and recycled scrap steel, while H2-DRI systems replace coal with hydrogen during the iron reduction process. At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward technological shift; however, the transition is a bit more complicated than just metallurgy. Hydrogen production requires enormous amounts of electricity, making steel decarbonization inseparable from other existing energy security vulnerabilities like electricity generation and energy imports. To circumvent this, Japanese steelmakers have begun turning toward importing reduced iron from places such as Australia and the Middle East, while concentrating on the later stages of steel production domestically.In 2024, Itochu Corporation partnered with JFE Steel and Emirates Steel to establish a supply chain for reduced iron from the UAE, with the goal of supplying Japanese steel production operations by 2027. However, this energy saving solution creates a paradox. The same maritime routes and geopolitical chokepoints that underpin Japan’s fossil fuel dependence may also underpin parts of its decarbonized industrial future. In addition, Japan imports a majority of its hydrogen from the Middle East, with Tokyo becoming a strategic partner to theMENA Hydrogen Allianceand the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) signing anMoUwith Saudi Aramco on hydrogen production in 2023. The Strait of Hormuz therefore matters not only because energy passes through it, but because future hydrogen and green iron supply chains may increasingly depend upon it as well. At the same time, the crisis may strengthen Washington’s leverage over Japan’s energy and industrial policy. As Japanese steelmakers move toward hydrogen-based steel production and imported reduced iron from countries such as the UAE, the security of those supply chains becomes tied to U.S.-led maritime stability in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. If shipping disruptions intensify, Japan may become more dependent on American security guarantees, naval protection, and diplomatic coordination to maintain access not only to oil and LNG, but also to future “green steel” inputs. The United States has already pushed for greater Japanese involvement in maritime security operations surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, requesting the escort of oil tankers by ally warships. The same maritime routes and geopolitical chokepoints that underpin Japan’s fossil fuel dependence may also underpin parts of its decarbonized industrial future. Of course, Japan remains politically cautious about direct confrontation with Iran due to its longstanding diplomatic and energy ties in the region, domestic public opposition to military escalation, and continued dependence on Middle Eastern imports. Yet decarbonization may deepen Japan’s dependencies at the exact moment Washington is attempting to reshape global energy, shipping, and industrial networks around strategic competition with China, Russia, and Iran. In this sense, steel decarbonization creates multidimensional pressure for Japan. It is becoming embedded within broader strategic competition over shipping routes, alliance coordination, industrial supply chains, and geopolitical influence. The result is a paradox at the center of Japan’s economic security strategy: decarbonization intended to reduce vulnerability may ultimately reorganize and redistribute that vulnerability instead of eliminating it. Helen Cecile Nowatka is a graduate student at Georgetown University focusing on Japanese political economy and energy security and currently working as a research Fellow at the Cannon Institute, conducting research on Japan and Middle East energy relations.