Porti & ambiente — le notizie raccolte

A pair of US class-action lawsuits has pulled back the curtain on what could become one of the most consequential antitrust cases ever to hit the container equipment sector, alleging that the world’s biggest box manufacturers colluded to restrict output, inflate prices and police each other’s behaviour during the pandemic supply chain crisis. The complaints, filed in a California federal court – one on behalf of US shipper CA Spalding, and the other on bechalf of trucking firm Daybreak Express –follow a US Department of Justice criminal case against container manufacturing giants including CIMC, Dong Fang, CXIC and Singamas. At the centre of the allegations is the claim that the manufacturers, which together produce 95% of global dry containers, agreed to limit output just as demand for containers surged. According to the lawsuits, executives from CIMC, Dong Fang, CXIC and a co-conspirator met in Shenzhen in November 2019 and agreed to restrict production by limiting factory shifts and working hours, refusing to build new manufacturing capacity and introducing monitoring systems to ensure compliance. The most eye-catching detail is a written agreement allegedly known as the “Shenzhen Moon Gazing Equity Investment Fund”, or the “Moon Gazing Fund”. According to the Daybreak Express complaint, CIMC circulated a draft of the contract to other defendants in early 2020, before the companies held a ceremony around March 2020 to execute a final version. The fund allegedly included a mechanism to financially penalise any company that cheated on the output-restriction agreement. The complaint also claims the manufacturers installed about 87 surveillance cameras across 49 production lines to monitor whether competitors were sticking to agreed output restrictions. One filing includes a screenshot of surveillance footage allegedly used in a June 2021 audit of production lines. But it is the internal communications cited in the filings that provide the most revealing glimpse into the alleged cartel. After a December 2019 meeting attended by the manufacturers, a Singamas executive allegedly reported that participants had discussed limiting shifts and hours, building “no new production lines”, installing CCTV in all production lines and requiring each factory to submit a deposit that would be deducted “if any factory break [sic] the agreement”. The executive then allegedly warned colleagues: “I have reminded them not to be high profile since it might violate the Monopoly Law or being accused of price manipulation by our customers.” In another exchange, a Singamas board member allegedly reacted to the report by writing: “The discussion appeared to be anti-competition to me. I feel very uneasy reading your report. May be [sic] we should delete this string of emails after reading?” Singamas chief executive SS Teo, who was last monthindicted by the Department of Justiceover the claims and has had to step down from his roles, allegedly replied: “Yes I feel the same.” The lawsuits further allege executives sought to sanitise internal presentations to avoid attracting antitrust scrutiny. In one example, a draft presentation referred to a “Manufacturing sector official and unofficial association/alliance”, to which one participant reportedly responded: “Please delete ‘alliance’ as it is quite sensitive under anti-trust law.” Another executive allegedly advised against including references to “market discipline” in an investor presentation because of potential antitrust concerns. Mr Teo allegedly replied that he would amend the slide and “take out” words. The allegations suggest the arrangement became increasingly sophisticated over time. Initially focused on limiting factory operating hours, the alleged conspiracy later evolved into formal production quotas. One presentation cited in the complaint set out “total allowable capacity” and “allowable quota” for participating manufacturers, allocating production volumes among companies and factory lines. Executives are also alleged to have exchanged confidential information through emails, WeChat groups and regular in-person meetings. The complaint claims manufacturers used surveillance footage from rival factories to audit compliance. The alleged conduct did not stop at dry containers. According to the filings, CIMC vice-president Tianhua Huang emailed the chief executive of a competing reefer manufacturer in May 2020, stating that dry container manufacturers had “reached a consensus and established industry self-discipline actions” and suggesting reefer manufacturers should “follow the dry box practice”. That proposal included “No capacity increase” and a requirement that “all standard reefer manufacturers run one shift only”. The invitation was allegedly rejected, with the recipient responding that “any such coordination is strictly forbidden by the compliance policies” of his company. The alleged conspiracy unfolded during one of the most chaotic periods in container shipping history, when supply chains were stretched to breaking point and equipment shortages became a defining feature of global trade. It also followed one of the worst years for container manufacturers,who issued a slew of profit warnings to investors over 2019’s financial performance– CIMC’s profit for the year was over 50% down on 2018, while Singamas swung from a $72m profit to a $95m loss in the same period. However, according to the Daybreak complaint, the price of a standard 20ft dry container more than doubled as the pandemic unfolded, rising from roughly $1,600 in 2019 to more than $3,500 by 2021. Prices for a 40ft box are alleged to have climbed from around $2,800 to more than $5,900 over the same period. The lawsuits claim those overcharges were passed through the supply chain, affecting buyers of transport services whose costs incorporated inflated container prices. Manufacturers allegedly enjoyed a windfall. One filing claims CIMC’s container manufacturing profits rose from RMB137m in 2019 to RMB11.3bn in 2021, while Singamas recorded a $187m profit in 2021. The financial stakes are potentially enormous. The complaint does not put a dollar value on the claim, but seeks damages, restitution and disgorgement on behalf of a nationwide class. Under US antitrust law, any proven damages may be trebled, significantly increasing any eventual award.

European Cargo’s collapse appears to have been driven by a combination of rising operating costs, customer concentration and mounting financial pressure, rather than fuel prices alone. The Bournemouth-based freighter airline entered administration on 3 June, with Teneo Financial Advisory citing reduced flying activity, working capital pressures, and fuel costs as the key factors. Yet an examination of company filings, operational data, and industry feedback suggests the roots of the collapse may stretch back much further. The airline built its business around converted A340-600 aircraft, creating one of the most distinctive fleets in the air cargo industry. While the Airbus planes offered low acquisition costs and significant capacity, they carried the burden of four engines at a time when much of the freighter market was shifting towards more fuel-efficient twin-engined aircraft. The challenge was not simply fuel prices, according to former European Cargo CEO David Kerr, who now runs JTD Advisory. “The simple equation is that fuel surcharge mechanisms needed to keep the economics of a four-engine freighter contract flying were likely unsustainable for a narrow customer base,” he toldThe Loadstar. But European Cargo had never fully escaped the financial pressures associated with its growth strategy. Accounts for 2024 show revenue of $136.3m, but a net loss of $26.1m, following a loss of $30.6m the previous year. The airline reported net liabilities of $41.8m and acknowledged a continuing reliance on shareholder support, despite management’s view that the business had reached operational break-even. At the same time, the carrier was expanding. European Cargo added operations from Teesside International Airport, continued to develop services linking the UK with western China, and publicly discussed further growth opportunities. Routes to destinations including Urumqi, Chongqing, and Chengdu became central to the airline’s network. Operational data reviewed byThe Loadstarsuggests flying activity actually reached its highest levels in March. Volumes declined sharply in April before collapsing last month. By the second half of May, activity had largely ceased, several weeks before administrators were appointed. The timing raises questions over what changed so rapidly. Mr Kerr believes customer concentration may have played an important role. “Clients who are agents fronting a few ecommerce retailers carry a big working capital risk and the hope of origin airport incentives at the back end,” he said. “That intermediary model must be under severe pressure from end-customer and airlines.” European Cargo’s network had become heavily focused on China-related cargo programmes, particularly routes serving its western cities. The airline and its airport partners frequently highlighted growth in ecommerce traffic, while Shenzhen Sharing Express Logistic-Tech (SSELT) featured prominently in announcements on the development of the Chengdu-Bournemouth cargo corridor. Although the precise commercial relationships remain unclear, Mr Kerr’s comments suggest the airline may have been operating within a relatively concentrated customer base. He himself questioned whether the carrier had diversified sufficiently. “I had made enquiries to ECL on behalf of potential clients, but they seemed reluctant to quote, perhaps at risk of upsetting their key client, or believing they had the market covered,” he said. “The lack of commercial diversity or ambition was a likely contributor, but not the root cause.” The airline’s ownership structure also changed significantly in late 2024. On 19 November, European Aviation exited the business and was replaced by new shareholders, including Carlos Miguel Amorim Da Silva and Trimcomlee Ltd. The restructuring coincided with a major refinancing exercise involving Nordic Trustee-backed financing arrangements secured against aircraft and shareholdings. Those financing arrangements were amended again in March and April this year, only weeks before operations ceased. Whether the refinancing activity reflected growth plans, funding pressures, or efforts to support a business facing deteriorating trading conditions remains unclear. What is clear is that European Cargo was attempting to operate a specialised fleet in an increasingly challenging market. Mr Kerr believes geopolitical events may also have accelerated the pressure on the business. “A committed, professional, and enthusiastic operational team survived perhaps longer than the Ukraine and Gulf conflicts should have allowed,” he said. For now, the administrator’s explanation remains limited to reduced flying activity, working capital pressures, and fuel costs. But the evidence emerging from the carrier’s final months suggests a more complex picture – of a loss-making airline pursuing growth, dependent on a relatively narrow customer base and operating a fuel-intensive fleet in a market that had become increasingly unforgiving. The administrator’s proposals and creditor reports, when published, are expected to provide a clearer picture of what ultimately grounded one of the industry’s most unusual freighter operators.

The CMHI shipyard in Shenzhen, China, has begun the construction of two methanol-ready dual-fuel multipurpose subsea vessels for Norway’s Olympic Subsea. Olympic Subsea reported that earlier in April the keel laying for the first vessel and the first steel cutting for the second vessel took place at the CMHI Shenzhen shipyard. The vessels will be ready to run on methanol and will feature battery hybrid technology, with delivery on track for the summer of 2027. They will operate in both the renewable energy and oil & gas sectors, featuring advanced technologies that are said to exceed the Paris Agreement requirements. The duo has been designed by Kongsberg Maritime in accordance with the UT7623 sustainable energy vessel (SEV) design,under a contract announced in March 2025. Described as the most energy-efficient in their category, the extensive package of integrated technology will encapsulate rim-drive electric azimuth propulsion, retractable azimuth bow thrusters, switchboards, and thruster drives, hybrid battery power, an integrated bridge system, automation and control systems, a dynamic positioning system, tank sounding, mooring winches, and an overhead ROV launch and recovery system (LARS). Take the spotlight and anchor your brand in the heart of the offshore world! Join us for a bigger impact and amplify your presence at the core hub of the offshore energy community!