Porti & ambiente — le notizie raccolte

Lo stabilimento Fincantieri di Riva Trigoso ha ospitato la cerimonia di taglio della lamiera della seconda fregata di nuova generazione tipo Fremm in versione Evolution (Fremm Evo) destinata alla Marina Militare. L’evento rappresenta l’avvio della costruzione della seconda unità (follow on ship), che segue la prima nave della classe la cui lavorazione era iniziata ad aprile 2025 con successiva impostazione dello scafo a luglio dello stesso anno. La procedura mette in atto l’accordo firmato a luglio 2024 tra Orizzonte Sistemi Navali — la joint venture partecipata da Fincantieri al 51% e Leonardo al 49% — e l’organizzazione Occar, che prevede la consegna della prima unità nel 2029 e della seconda nel 2030. All’incontro hanno preso parte il direttore della Direzione degli armamenti navali, ammiraglio Nervi, il direttore della Divisione navi militari di Fincantieri, Dario Santagata, e l’amministratore delegato di Orizzonte Sistemi Navali, Giovanni Sorrentino. Ha presenziato alla cerimonia anche il contrammiraglio Antonio Mateus, vicedirettore della Direzione nazionale degli armamenti portoghese: una partecipazione che si inserisce nel quadro del recente ingresso del Portogallo nel programma Occar, che vedrà Lisbona acquisire tre fregate Fremm Evo con il supporto finanziario del prestito europeo Safe. L’avvio dei lavori sul secondo scafo avviene a pochi mesi dal superamento della critical design review (Cdr) del programma, completata a dicembre 2025. Le unità della classe Fremm Evo rappresentano un salto generazionale dal punto di vista tecnologico e operativo poiché integrano interventi di ammodernamento sulla piattaforma con criteri di cyber-resilience per lo ship management system e soluzioni green, affiancati dal sistema di combattimento Sadoc 4, da apparati radar Dual Band Dbr-X-C predisposti per la difesa antimissile Tbm e da configurazioni avanzate per il contrasto alle minacce drone e la gestione di sistemi unmanned di superficie e subacquei. ISCRIVITI ALLA NEWSLETTER QUOTIDIANA GRATUITA DI SHIPPING ITALY SHIPPING ITALY E’ ANCHE SU WHATSAPP: BASTA CLICCARE QUI PER ISCRIVERSI AL CANALE ED ESSERE SEMPRE AGGIORNATI

More news on this day Madeira’s main ports have been formally included in a new European Union derogation from maritime fuel rules, a move that will ease compliance costs on routes linking the archipelago with the Azores and other outermost regions while the islands continue their transition to cleaner shipping. Get the latest news straight to your inbox! Publicly available information from the Official Journal of the European Union shows that Portugal has activated a derogation under Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 on the use of renewable and low carbon fuels in maritime transport, commonly known as FuelEU Maritime. The notification, released in June 2026, lists key ports in Madeira and the Azores among those benefiting from more flexible application of the new rules during an initial phase. The derogation specifically covers cruise and other passenger services operating between ports in Madeira, the Azores and the wider family of EU outermost regions. In practice, this means that vessels serving itineraries that interconnect islands such as Madeira, Porto Santo, São Miguel or Terceira, as well as links to other outermost regions, will face reduced immediate compliance pressures compared with ships on standard intra-EU routes. Regional and European-level documents describe the measure as part of a broader approach to accommodate the structural challenges of remote island economies, where maritime connections are essential for tourism, trade and social cohesion. Madeira’s gateways at Funchal and Caniçal, together with a network of Azorean ports, are central nodes in that system and are now explicitly recognised within the FuelEU Maritime framework. The decision aligns with the long-standing status of Madeira and the Azores as EU outermost regions under Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which allows tailored responses to geographical and economic constraints. The derogation is framed as temporary, linked to the period in which local operators and port authorities adapt to the technical and financial demands of cleaner propulsion and alternative fuels. The European Commission’s communication on Portugal’s use of the FuelEU Maritime exemption includes a detailed table of ports in the autonomous regions. For Madeira, the Port of Funchal and the cargo-focused Port of Caniçal are named, reflecting their dual importance for cruise tourism and essential supply chains. Porto Santo’s port is also identified, underlining the role of short inter-island links in the overall transport network. In the Azores, the list runs from Ponta Delgada on São Miguel to Praia da Vitória and Angra do Heroísmo on Terceira, as well as Horta, Lajes do Pico, Madalena, São Roque, Vila do Porto and a series of smaller island ports including Corvo and Flores. By mapping these locations, the EU effectively designates an interconnected set of maritime corridors within which the derogation applies to specified services. Travel and tourism operators are expected to benefit from greater predictability as they plan itineraries for the late 2020s. Cruise lines linking Madeira with the Canary Islands and other Atlantic destinations, as well as inter-island ferry providers, can schedule fleet investments and retrofits with clearer knowledge of how fuel intensity and emissions targets will be phased in on these particular routes. For passengers, the effect is likely to be most visible in the preservation of existing connectivity patterns. Reports indicate that policymakers were keen to avoid abrupt changes to capacity or pricing on lifeline services, particularly for smaller islands that depend on regular maritime links for both residents and visitors. The new FuelEU Maritime derogation sits alongside earlier flexibility granted to outermost regions under the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to shipping. Guidance from European institutions notes that voyages between ports in Madeira or the Azores and mainland Portugal already benefit from a specific surrender derogation during the transition period for maritime ETS, reflecting concerns about disproportionate cost impacts on island regions. By pairing the ETS approach with the FuelEU Maritime exemption, Brussels and Lisbon are effectively layering instruments that recognise the same structural vulnerability: high dependence on maritime transport combined with limited immediate access to alternative fuels and shore-side infrastructure. The combined effect is intended to give operators in Madeira and the Azores a realistic timeframe in which to modernise vessels and bunkering systems without undermining connectivity. At the same time, recent European Commission reports on outermost regions emphasise that long-term climate objectives remain unchanged. Madeira and the Azores are expected to transition toward lower-emission fleets and improved port facilities, including better energy efficiency, onshore power supply and readiness for sustainable fuels. The derogations are described as targeted calibrations of the timeline rather than exemptions from the eventual standards. For the travel sector, this balancing act is significant. Cruise tourism is a major contributor to Madeira’s visitor economy, while ferries and mixed-use vessels are vital for mobility within the archipelagos. Maintaining service levels while accelerating decarbonisation is presented as a shared challenge for authorities, port managers and private operators alike. Recent data from the Regional Directorate of Statistics of Madeira show that the archipelago has been improving its position in EU social and economic indicators among outermost regions, helped in part by a resilient tourism sector. Cruise traffic through Funchal and rising numbers of island-hopping visitors have supported local employment and business activity, particularly in hospitality, retail and shore excursions. The cost of maritime energy transition, however, is expected to be substantial. Installing alternative fuel infrastructure, upgrading port facilities and refitting or replacing vessels involve multi-year investment cycles. Analysts following EU cohesion and transport policies note that the outermost regions, including Madeira and the Azores, will likely depend on a mix of EU funds, national programmes and private capital to finance these changes. Without calibrated derogations, there had been concerns that stricter fuel rules could push up operating costs more quickly than smaller island markets could absorb, with potential knock-on effects for fares and service frequency. The newly formalised exemption for specific routes is being interpreted in regional coverage as a signal that the EU intends to protect territorial cohesion while still steering the sector toward net-zero objectives. For local communities, the stakes are not only economic but also social. Maritime links underpin access to healthcare, education and cultural exchange across the islands, as well as facilitating the flows of visitors that many businesses rely on. Ensuring that regulatory shifts do not unintentionally erode this connectivity has been a recurring theme in debates across outermost regions. For travelers planning cruises or ferry journeys involving Madeira and the Azores over the next few years, the immediate implications of the EU derogation are subtle but positive. Industry observers expect continuity in existing itineraries and capacity, with operators less likely to withdraw or substantially alter routes purely because of short-term regulatory cost spikes linked to fuel rules. In the medium term, visitors may begin to notice more visible signs of the green transition at island ports, such as investments in cleaner auxiliary power systems, modernised terminals and, eventually, vessels capable of running on alternative fuels. Policy documents on the EU’s outermost regions stress that these upgrades are not only environmental measures but also opportunities to enhance service quality and resilience. Further EU and national-level decisions will determine how long the FuelEU Maritime derogation for Madeira and the Azores remains in force and under what conditions it might be adjusted. The evolving strategy for outermost regions, which the European institutions are currently updating, is expected to integrate transport, climate and cohesion objectives in a more coordinated framework covering the period to 2030 and beyond. For now, the formal recognition of Madeira’s ports within the new exemption framework reinforces their status as strategic Atlantic hubs linking Europe to its most distant territories. As regulatory timelines and investment plans crystallise, the archipelagos are positioning themselves as laboratories for reconciling ambitious decarbonisation goals with the practical realities of island connectivity and tourism growth.

Con el rápido crecimiento del sector de los cruceros en Portugal, ya no se puede considerar que este sector forme parte únicamente del turismo. También se ha convertido en un tema de debate político en lo que respecta a la movilidad marítima, la política portuaria, la transición energética, la innovación y la planificación urbana. in ·19 jun 2026, 18:31·0 Comentarios El sector de los cruceros en Portugal está registrando actualmente cifras récord. En 2024, el turismo de cruceros generó un impacto económico de 940 millones de euros y sustentó 9.800 puestos de trabajo en Portugal. Lisboa, que es el puerto con mayor tráfico de cruceros de Portugal, cuenta con más de 763.000 pasajeros y casi 600.000 pasajeros en tránsito. Asimismo, Funchal, en Madeira, ha registrado en 2025 su mejor año de la historia en cuanto a cruceros, lo que ha generado 62,9 millones de euros para la economía regional. Según Ana Lourenço, directora de Turismo Marítimo de la Autoridad Portuaria de Lisboa y presidenta del Comité de Sostenibilidad de Cruise Europe, el último informe dela CLIA, «State of the Cruise Industry 2025», revela que, si bien la actividad de los cruceros está superando ya los niveles previos a la pandemia y aumentando no solo gracias a los pasajeros que viajan por primera vez, sino también a los que repiten, el sector de los cruceros ha logrado adaptarse gracias a una demanda resiliente y a una sólida capacidad de innovación comercial, lo que lo convierte en uno de los segmentos más dinámicos de la economía marítima y del turismo internacional. Durante años, el sector se ha centrado principalmente en indicadores de volumen, como el número de escalas, el número de pasajeros atendidos y el crecimiento anual. Sin embargo, parece estar surgiendo algo nuevo: una lógica más sofisticada, en la que es importante evaluar el valor económico generado, pero también la calidad de la operación, la integración urbana, la eficiencia energética y la capacidad de responder a un pasajero más informado y exigente. El crecimiento del sector no solo se debe al regreso del pasajero tradicional, sino también a la incorporación de nuevos públicos, a la diversificación de las experiencias ofrecidas y a la capacidad del sector para atender a perfiles de consumidores más segmentados. La autenticidad, el segmento premium y los nichos se han convertido en factores decisivos. Y dado que la edad media actual de un pasajero de crucero es ahora de 46,5 años, están surgiendo indicios de un perfil de demanda más diverso y rejuvenecido. La Generación X y los millennials son los grupos más entusiastas, y el 80 % tiene la intención de realizar o repetir este tipo de viaje. En el contexto actual del mercado de los cruceros, Portugal cuenta con condiciones favorables dada su ubicación geográfica junto al océano Atlántico y cerca del mar Mediterráneo. Su diversidad de puertos y su condición de destino en sí mismo le confieren una ventaja competitiva, factores clave para su éxito. Según Ana Lourenço, los próximos años serán, sin embargo, exigentes. Con la aplicación de FuelEU Maritime, la integración del sector marítimo en el RCDE de la UE y la transición energética general, las importantes inversiones tendrán un impacto directo en la forma en que los puertos se organizarán y planificarán su futuro. Sin embargo, el trabajo ya ha comenzado, y la capacidad de adaptación de los puertos ya ha sentado las bases para abordar esta transición de forma preparada, eficiente y sostenible.

Con la rapida crescita del settore crocieristico portoghese, quest’ultimo non può più essere considerato solo come una componente del turismo. È ormai entrato a far parte del dibattito politico in materia di mobilità marittima, politica portuale, transizione energetica, innovazione e pianificazione urbana. in ·19 giu 2026, 18:31·0 Commmenti Il settore crocieristico portoghese sta attualmente registrando livelli record. Nel 2024, il turismo crocieristico ha generato un impatto economico pari a 940 milioni di euro e ha sostenuto 9.800 posti di lavoro in Portogallo. Lisbona, che è il porto con il maggior traffico crocieristico del Portogallo, ha registrato oltre 763.000 passeggeri e quasi 600.000 passeggeri in transito. Inoltre, Funchal, a Madeira, ha registrato nel 2025 il suo miglior anno di sempre per quanto riguarda le crociere, generando 62,9 milioni di euro per l’economia regionale. Secondo Ana Lourenco, direttrice del turismo marittimo presso l’Autorità Portuale di Lisbona e presidente del Comitato per la sostenibilità di Cruise Europe, l’ultimo rapporto dellaCLIA“Stato del settore crocieristico 2025”, rivela che, sebbene l’attività crocieristica stia ormai superando i livelli pre-pandemia e sia in crescita non solo grazie ai passeggeri occasionali ma anche a quelli abituali, il settore crocieristico è riuscito ad adattarsi grazie alla domanda resiliente e alla forte capacità di innovazione commerciale, diventando così uno dei segmenti più dinamici dell’economia marittima e del turismo internazionale. Per anni, il settore si è concentrato principalmente su indicatori di volume, numero di scali, passeggeri trasportati e crescita annuale. Tuttavia, sembra emergere qualcosa di nuovo: una logica più sofisticata, in cui è importante valutare non solo il valore economico generato, ma anche la qualità dell’operatività, l’integrazione urbana, l’efficienza energetica e la capacità di rispondere a un passeggero più informato ed esigente. La crescita del settore non è dovuta solo al ritorno del passeggero tradizionale, ma anche all’ingresso di nuovi segmenti di pubblico, alla diversificazione delle esperienze offerte e alla capacità del settore di soddisfare profili di consumatori sempre più segmentati. Autenticità, fascia premium e nicchia sono diventati fattori decisivi. E poiché l’età media attuale di un passeggero di crociera è ora di 46,5 anni, stanno emergendo segnali di un profilo della domanda più diversificato e ringiovanito. La Generazione X e i Millennial sono i gruppi più entusiasti, con l’80% che intende intraprendere o ripetere questo tipo di viaggio. Nell’attuale contesto del mercato crocieristico, il Portogallo gode di condizioni favorevoli grazie alla sua posizione geografica sull’Oceano Atlantico e in prossimità del Mar Mediterraneo. La diversità dei suoi porti e il fatto di essere una destinazione a sé stante conferiscono al Portogallo un vantaggio competitivo, fattori chiave per il suo successo. Secondo Ana Lourenco, i prossimi anni saranno tuttavia impegnativi. Con l’attuazione di FuelEU Maritime, l’integrazione del settore marittimo nel sistema europeo di scambio delle quote di emissione (ETS) e la transizione energetica generale, investimenti significativi avranno un impatto diretto sul modo in cui i porti si organizzeranno e pianificheranno il futuro. Tuttavia, il lavoro è già iniziato e la capacità di adattamento dei porti ha già gettato le basi per affrontare questa transizione in modo preparato, efficiente e sostenibile.

Jaula para insectos instalada en una cuadra de las ovejas de la comunidad de montes de Baroña./ Cedida Suso Souto La actividad de lacomunidad de montes de Baroña(O Porto do Son) no conoce límites cuando se trata de avanzar hacia unaexplotación sostenibledel bosque. Y, más allá de susnumerosas iniciativas, la entidad participa también en variosproyectos de investigación. Uno de ellos es el que puso en marcha laUniversidad de Lisboapara analizar qué especies de insectos hay en diferentes explotaciones ganaderas deEspañayPortugal. De modo que en una de las cuadras del rebaño deovejasde la comunidad de montes deBaroñahan colocadouna jaula para insectos. "Dentro de unos días recogerán el recipiente para analizar los resultados obtenidos y saber así a qué nos enfrentamos en términos de sanidad animal", explicaOvidio Queiruga, presidente de la entidad. El proyecto lo lleva a cabo el Instituto de Hixiene e Medicina Tropical de la Universidad de Lisboa./ Cedida El citado proyecto se lleva a cabo desde la Unidad de Parasitología Médica delInstituto de Hixiene e Medicina Tropicalde la universidad lisboeta. Buscan un determinado tipo de mosquito para ver si ya está asentado en laPenínsula Ibérica. La Universidad de Lisboa, a través delInstituto de Hixiene e Medicina Tropical, lidera investigaciones clave sobre la presencia y proliferación de mosquitos vectores de enfermedades enPortugal. En el marco del programaMosquitoWEB, una iniciativa de ciencia ciudadana impulsada por el instituto, investigadores de dicha universidad recopilan datos de avistamientos reportados por la población para mapear la expansión de insectos que son vectores de patógenos. Además, expertos del Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Environmental Changes (cE3c) de la Universidad de Lisboa participan en estudios sobre lainteracción humanos-mosquitos, en colaboración con plataformas como Mosquito Alert. Eso sí: la jaula instalada en Baroña atrapará todo cuanto insecto se le arrime.

byAlfred W. McCoy|Apr 28, 2026| My life began in wartime — World War II — and, if Donald Trump has anything to say about it, will evidently end in war, too. The president who, as advertised, didn’t go to war in his first term in office, alsoinsisted thenthat the U.S. should stop engaging in “endless” “forever wars.” Even while running for office a third time in 2024, he swore that his task on returning to the White House would be to remove “warmongers and America-last globalists” from power and “turn the page forever on those foolish, stupid days of never-ending wars. They never ended.” As the 2024 election results suggested, his followers appeared to deeply agree with him on that goal. In fact, back in April 2016, in aNew York Timesop-ed, J.D. Vance (of all people!), whileinsistingthat “Mr. Trump is unfit for our nation’s highest office,” did make a single exception. As president, Vance was convinced, he wouldn’t take our country to war again. As he put it then, “Anger about the wars isn’t the only reason voters support Mr. Trump. But his willingness to say what other G.O.P. candidates won’t reflects what people like most about him: his complete break with the party elite.” Well, J.D., these days, think again (and again and again). Welcome to the new world of Donald Trump. Now, it seems, he is eternally at war. Of course, that may be because the Trump we once knew, for all his faults, didn’t yet consider himself a god or imagine himself as — yes! — themodern equivalent of Jesus Christand so capable of doing anything his heart desires. As it turns out, he was led into war in the Strait of Hormuz by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (whose Iranian regime-change scenarios CIA Director John Ratcliffe once termed “farcical”). Yes, a number of his cabinet members and Vice President Vance, as theNew York Timesreported, “warned Mr. Trump that a war against Iran could cause regional chaos and untold numbers of casualties. It could also break apart Mr. Trump’s political coalition and would be seen as a betrayal by many voters who had bought into the promise of no new wars.” A betrayal indeed! And yet, Operation Epic Fury began anyway and, of course, as a disaster in the making, it has yet to end. Now, with all of that in mind, letTomDispatchregular Alfred McCoy, the author most recently of the must-read new history bookCold War on Five Continentsand an analyst who haslong been awarethat warring in the Strait of Hormuz would be a formula for U.S. imperial decline, put the present U.S. disaster in Iran in deep historical perspective.~ Tom Engelhardt Writing more than 2,000 years ago, the Greek historianPlutarchgave us an eloquent description of what modern historians now call “micro-militarism.” When an imperial power like Athens then, or America now, is in decline, its leaders often react emotionally by mounting seemingly bold military strikes in hopes of regaining the imperial grandeur that’s slipping through their fingers. Instead of another of the great victories the empire won at its peak of power, however, such military misadventures only serve to accelerate the ongoing decline, erasing whatever aura of imperial majesty remains and revealing instead the moral rot deep inside the ruling elite. There is mounting historical evidence that America is indeed an empire in steep decline, while President Donald Trump’s war of choice against Iran is becoming the sort of micro-military disaster that helped destroy successive empires over the past 2,500 years — from ancient Athens to medieval Portugal to modern Spain, Great Britain, and now the United States. And at the core of every such ill-fated war-making decision lay a problematic leader, often born into wealth and prestige, whose personal inadequacies reflected and ramified the many irrationalities that make imperial decline such a painful process. During that demoralizing downward spiral, imperial armies, so lethal in an empire’s ascent, can err by plunging their countries into draining, even disastrous “micro-military” misadventures — psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the loss of imperial power by trying to occupy new territories or display awe-inspiring military might. Although such micro-militarism often chose targets that proved strategically unsustainable, the psychological pressures upon declining empires are so strong that they all too often gamble their prestige on just such misadventures. Not only did such disasters add financial pressures to a fading empire’s many troubles, but in a humiliating fashion, they also invariably exposed its eroding power while exacerbating the destabilizing impact of imperial decline in the capitals of empire (whether Athens, Lisbon, Madrid, London, or Washington, D.C.). In our moment, when the bombs stop falling and the rubble is finally cleared from the streets of Tehran and Beirut, the impact on U.S. global power of such a de facto defeat will become all too clear — as alliances like NATO atrophy, American hegemony evaporates, legitimacy is lost, global disorder rises, and the world economy suffers. Let me now turn from the disasters of the present imperial moment to the lessons of history to explore the sort of lasting damage that Donald Trump’s micro-military misadventure in the Middle East might be inflicting on this country’s declining imperium. The Defeat of Athens in Sicily The date was 413 BC. The place was ancient Athens, then the seat of a powerful empire, long dominant around the rim of the Aegean Sea but losing influence to a sustained military challenge by Sparta. At the port of Piraeus, a “certain stranger,” as the historian and philosopherPlutarch recalled, “took a seat in a barber’s shop, and began to discourse [on] what had happened as if the Athenians already knew all about it.” Stunned by this stranger’s report of a military debacle in far-off Sicily, the barber “ran at the top of his speed to the upper city” of Athens, where the news sparked “consternation and confusion.” What that stranger described was the greatest military disaster in the history of the Athenian empire. Two years earlier, in the midst of the protracted Peloponnesian Wars, the aristocrat Nicias — an indifferent, indecisive leader who used his inherited wealth to court popularity with lavish spectacles — persuaded the citizens of Athens to deliver a theoretically bold blow against a rival imperial power, Sparta, by attacking its ally Syracuse in Sicily in hopes of crippling the enemy, capturing riches, and recovering Athens’ ebbing hegemony. Instead of victory, however, Athens’ vast armada of 200 ships and some 12,000 soldiers suffered a devastating defeat. Not only was the fleet destroyed (largely because Niciasproved“an incompetent military commander”), but his surviving soldiers were captured, confined on a starvation diet in a stone quarry, and sold into slavery. Athens never recovered. Within a decade, the city had been starved into submission by Sparta’simpenetrable blockadeof a naval chokepoint in the Dardanelles Strait, stripped of its empire, and subjected to autocratic rule by a pro-Spartan oligarchy. Portugal’s Debacle in Morocco Our next date is 1578. The place is Portugal, the seat of a lucrative empire that had controlled commerce across the Indian Ocean for decades but now found its hegemony challenged by Muslim merchant princes allied with the Ottoman Empire. In its capital, Lisbon, a headstrong young king,Sebastian, suffered from sexual impotence and a fiery temperament that made him a fanatical “captain of Christ.” With the idea of striking a lethal blow in his country’s global war against Islam, the young king persuaded the flower of his nation’s aristocracy to follow him on a latter-day crusade across the Mediterranean Sea to Morocco. There, at the fatefulBattle of Alcácer Quibir, Portugal’s army was slaughtered by local Muslim forces. Some 8,000 Portuguese troops were killed, 15,000 captured, and only 100 escaped. The defeat was so devastating that it not only destroyed the king and his court but also precipitated the country’s incorporation into the Spanish empire for the next 60 years. In the aftermath of such reverses, the PortugueseEstado da India(or state of India) at Goa was reduced to selling permits to any ship captain who could pay, whether Hindu, Muslim, or Christian. With Portuguese commercial dominance removed from the Indian Ocean, Muslim merchants and pilgrims could once again move across it unimpeded. Though the Portuguese empire would survive for another three centuries, it would never recover the commercial hegemony that had once allowed it to dominate the world’s sea lanes from the Spice Islands of Indonesia, across the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic to the coast of Brazil. Spain’s Disaster in the Atlas Mountains And now to jump several centuries, another significant date for imperial disasters is 1920. The place was Madrid, where Spain’s leaders were already reeling from the psychological stress of their country’s long imperial decline, culminating in the loss of its last colonies, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War of 1898 with the rising United States. Seeking regeneration through further colonial conquest, Spain’s conservative leaders reacted to that demoralizing defeat against America by expanding their small coastal enclaves in northern Morocco to establish a protectorate over the whole region and its arid Atlas Mountains. Spain’s inept monarch Alfonso XIII, who liked to play soldier,cultivated a cliqueof military favorites who shared his passion for the recovery of lost imperial glory by pacifying that rugged terrain. As resistance to Spanish rule by Berber Muslims escalated into the bloody Rif War of 1920, one of the king’s favorite generals led his troops into theBattle of Annual, where Berber fighters slaughtered some 12,000 of them. Nonetheless, through the influence of the king and his military cronies, Spain clung desperately to those profitless Moroccan mountains. The Spaniards would, in fact, dispatch 125,000 more troops there, including its Foreign Legion led by the man who, in the 1930s, would become the leader of a fascist Spain, Francisco Franco, for a protracted pacification campaign that featured both mass slaughter and military innovation. In a desperate quest for a victory that defied both economic and strategic rationality, Spain produced some 400 metric tons of lethal mustard gas to conduct history’s first aerial bombardment using poison gas, raining mass death down upon Berber villages. And in military history’s first successful amphibious operation, the Spanish navy also landed 18,000 troops and a squadron of light tanks at Al Hoceima Bay in September 1925 to flank and soon defeat the Berber guerrillas there. Such micro-militarism, however, not only plunged Spain into a protracted pacification campaign with soaring costs, heavy casualties, and mass atrocities, but also unleashed political forces that would destroy its struggling democracy. As the masses protested that misbegotten war, King Alfonso backed a military favorite,General Primo de Rivera,in imposing a decade of dictatorship that finally gave way to a short-lived Second Republic. In 1936, however, only a decade after the Rif War ended, General Franco flew his Army of Africa back from Morocco over the Mediterranean Sea, launching a Spanish civil war that would defeat the Republic and establish a fascist dictatorship that would rule the country for nearly 40 dismal years of economic stagnation. The End of the British Empire at Suez Arguably, when it came to imperial decline, however, the most revealing date was 1956. The place was London, the seat of the once-proud British Empire, where the suffocating stress of a painful, protracted global imperial retreat had pushed British conservatives into a disastrous micro-military intervention at Egypt’s Suez Canal, leading to what one British diplomat would term the “dying convulsion of British imperialism.” In July 1956 (as described in my recent bookCold War on Five Continents), Egypt’s charismatic president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, ending British colonial control there, electrifying the Arab world, and elevating himself to the first rank of world leaders. Although British ships could still pass freely through the canal, the country’s conservative prime minister, Anthony Eden, a vain aristocrat and determined defender of empire, would be deeply unsettled, if not unhinged, by Nasser’s assertive nationalism. Indeed, his leadership throughout the crisis would prove so unbalanced that senior Foreign Office officials would becomeconvinced“Eden has gone off his head.” In response to the news of the canal’s nationalization, an apoplectic Eden would immediately convene a council of war at 4:00 in the morning. Calling Nasser a “Muslim Mussolini,” a reference to the former fascist ruler of Italy, Eden ordered “him removed and I don’t give a damn if there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt.” Making his meaning perfectly clear, Eden asked his foreign minister: “What’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralising’ him as you call it?” He then added pointedly: “I want him destroyed, can’t you understand? I want him murdered.” With the British secret service MI6 failing in multiple assassination attempts, however, Eden’s government began plotting with the French and Israelis to launch a secret, two-phase invasion of the Suez Canal Zone. On October 29th, the Israeli army led by the dashing General Moshe Dayan swept across the Sinai Peninsula, destroying Egyptian tanks and bringing his troops within 10 miles of the canal. Using that fighting as a pretext for its own intervention (supposedly to restore peace), in just three days, an armada of six Anglo-French aircraft carriers smashed the Egyptian air force, destroying 104 of its new Soviet MIG jet fighters and 130 additional aircraft. With Egypt’s strategic forces destroyed and its military virtually helpless before the might of that imperial juggernaut, Nasser deployed a geopolitical strategy brilliant in its simplicity. He had dozens of rusting cargo ships filled with rocks and then scuttled them at the canal’s northern entrance, quickly closing one of the world’s main maritime choke points and so cutting off Europe’s oil lifeline to the Persian Gulf. By the time 22,000 British and French forces began storming ashore at the canal’s north end on November 6th, their objective of securing the free movement of ships had already been snatched from their grasp. By the end of that micro-military disaster, Britain would be reprimanded by the United Nations; its currency would require an International Monetary Fund bailout to save it from utter collapse; its aura of imperial majesty would have evaporated; and the once mighty British Empire would be on the road to extinction. In retrospect, the Suez Crisis would not only expose the full-scale decline of British power, but also show the world that the country’s ruling Conservative establishment, with its illusions of imperial and racial superiority, was no longer capable of global leadership. America’s Defeat in the Strait of Hormuz Another date likely to prove all too significant when it comes to the history of imperial decline is February 28, 2026. The place was Washington, D.C., home to what had been history’s most powerful imperial state that had dominated much of the globe for nearly 80 years through a mixture of military alliances, deft diplomacy, and economic leadership. By then, however, cracks had distinctly begun to appear in its edifice of power as U.S. global hegemony faced an increasingly strong economic challenge from China, its massive military suffered two searing defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its economic globalization produced an angry populism at home. After a populist campaign based on promises to restore both working-class prosperity and America’s global power, Donald Trump took office a second time in January 2025promisinga “golden age of America,” a “thrilling new era of national success” in which the country would “reclaim its rightful place as the greatest, most powerful, most respected nation on earth, inspiring the awe and admiration of the entire world.” Born to wealth and privilege himself, Trump returned to office convinced of his unique “genius” for leadership andbelievingthat “I was saved by God to make America great again.” Wielding raw economic and military might to compel obeisance from friend and foe alike, the president, inspired by a delusional sense of divine mission, began attempting to bend the world to his will. But during his first year in office, nothing seemed to work as planned. Indeed, most of his initiatives produced the sort of backlash that only served to show how far the United States had fallen from 1991, when the break-up of the Soviet Union made it the world’s sole superpower. On April 2, 2025, on what he called “Liberation Day,” Trumpannounceda roster of punitive tariffs toprotectdomestic manufacturing largely from Chinese imports that faced an initial duty of 34% —later raisedto a fully punitive 100%. But at their October 2025 meeting in South Korea, China’s leader Xi Jinpingforced Trumpto back down by cutting U.S. access to his country’s storehouse of strategic rare earth minerals. In January, with his tariff initiative losing its luster, Trump plunged the NATO alliance into crisis by demanding that Denmark give him the island of Greenland, threatening to imposenew tariffson European allies unless they complied. Within a week, however, vociferous European resistance had led him to retract that threat at the Davos economic summit, claiming he was satisfied withNATO’s offerof a “framework of a future deal.” On February 28th, 2026, with his tariff initiative failing and his Greenland gambit checkmated, Trump joined Israel in a seemingly bold strike on Iran that soon had the makings of the sort of fateful “micro-military” maneuver that appears to go with imperial powers in decline. In the first few days of war, U.S. and Israeli bombing killed Iran’s leadership, destroyed its navy, and eliminated its air defenses, leaving the country seemingly prostrate before the might of America’s air-power juggernaut. After a week of devastating bombardment that seemed to stun the world with its lethality and precision, on March 6th Trumpdemandedthat Iran offer an “unconditional surrender” and signal its capitulation by “the selection of a GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader.” In exchange, he promised that the U.S. would “work tirelessly to bring Iran back from the brink of destruction.” But much as Nasser had done at Suez in 1956, Iran’s leadership reversed the war’s geostrategic balance by closing a critical maritime choke point in the Strait of Hormuz. By strikingfive freighters with dronesin the first week of war, Iran’s leaders, taking a leaf from Nasser’s geopolitical playbook, effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic, cutting off gas, fertilizer, and oil shipments that plunged the world economy into anunprecedented energy crisis. By the end of March, Iran’s chokehold over the strait was so tight that it begancollecting “tolls”from freighters to permit passage. Blindsidedby the Strait’s unexpected yet utterly predictable closure, on April 5th, Easter Sunday, an unsettled Trump posted asocial media messagesaying: “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!!” He added: “Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell — JUST WATCH. Praise be to Allah.” Two days later, Trumpthreatenedthat, unless Iran opened the Strait of Hormuz, he would attack its civilian infrastructure so severely that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” After the collapse of subsequent negotiations between the two sides at Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 12th, Trump plunged ever deeper into theIran quagmire,orderingthe U.S. Navy to “begin the process of BLOCKADING any and all Ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz,” and “interdict every vessel in International Waters that has paid a toll to Iran.” With characteristic bluster, headded: “We are fully ‘LOCKED AND LOADED,’ and our Military will finish up the little that is left of Iran!” Even if Trump destroys Iran’s infrastructure or eventually negotiates a face-saving peace deal, by every metric that really matters, Washington has already lost its war with Iran. Like all weaker powers in asymmetric warfare, Tehran has been willing to absorb relentless punishment, while inflicting pain that the dominant power can ill sustain. The U.S. will soon run out of targets in Tehran, but Iran has a whole world of damage that its cheap drones can do to the elaborate, exposed petroleum infrastructure on the south shore of the Persian Gulf. Like Britain at Suez in 1956, Washington will likely pay a heavy price for its “micro-militarism” in the Strait of Hormuz. Close allies, the bedrock of U.S. global power for 80 years, haverefused any military supportfor Washington’s war of choice, prompting Trump to call them “cowards.” In response to his thundering threats of civilian and civilizational destruction (both war crimes), Trump has beencondemnedby world leaders. Oblivious to the dangers of war in a region that is the epicenter of global capitalism, Washington is now proving ever more dangerously disruptive of the global economy, making China look like a far more stable choice for world leadership. Moreover, while the U.S. military has proven its tactical agility in destroying targets, it clearly can no longer capture meaningful strategic objectives. With its alliances in tatters, its world leadership forfeited, and its aura of military might evaporating, the only trajectory for U.S. global hegemony now seems to be downward (like so many great powers of the past). By the time Trump’s micro-military misadventure in the Strait of Hormuz is over, the decline of U.S. global power will have accelerated drastically and the world will be trying to move beyond the oldPax Americanatoward a new, distinctly uncertain global order. Copyright 2026 Alfred McCoy Alfred W. McCoy, aTomDispatchregular,is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author ofIn the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global PowerandTo Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change(Dispatch Books). His new book, just published, isCold War on Five Continents: The Geopolitics of Empire & Espionage. Follow TomDispatch onTwitterand join us onFacebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel,Songlands(the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novelEvery Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’sA Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’sIn the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’sThe Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II,and Ann Jones’sThey Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story. 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